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Abstract 
 
In the last two decades many major regulatory issues in Florida have been resolved by 
means of stipulated settlements between the utilities and interested parties, notably the 
Office of Public Counsel, instead of by the traditional method of hearings and 
litigation before the Public Services Commission. This paper investigates the extent, 
nature and effects of these stipulations in the electricity sector there. They have now 
largely superceded the litigated process. Their purpose is not to save costs, which are 
orders of magnitude less than the revenues at stake. Stipulations have brought 
reductions in electricity revenues worth over $3 billion, mainly during the last decade. 
These reductions are greater than would have otherwise occurred: about three quarters 
might never have occurred at all. In some cases a change in the method of rate 
reduction favoured industrial consumers but other customers are nonetheless likely to 
have benefited despite this. Some benefits were outside the scope of the commission 
to confer. Other benefits reflected a more flexible accounting policy. Most 
importantly, there has been a shift from conventional rate of return regulation, and 
from earnings sharing schemes with profits caps, to prices fixed for specified periods 
of time with revenue-sharing incentive arrangements. Stipulations have transformed 
the regulatory landscape in the Florida electricity sector, and their use seems worth 
considering elsewhere. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
JEL classification: L51 Economics of regulation, L97 Utilities general, L94 Electric 
utilities, L 95 Gas utilities, pipelines, water utilities. 
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1. Introduction 
 
US public utility regulation has traditionally involved decisions by the regulatory 
commission following litigation of cases at public hearings. Over the last quarter 
century some US public utility commissions have replaced or supplemented this 
process by endorsing settlements (sometimes called stipulations or stipulated 
settlements) that have been negotiated and agreed in previous discussions between the 
utilities and other interested parties (or ‘intervenors’) and their appointed 
representatives. But relatively little seems to be known about the extent of 
settlements, and their purpose and effect. How important are they, and what if any 
difference do they make? 
 
Initially, settlements were seen as a means of speeding up decisions (notably to reduce 
the backlog at the Federal Power Commission) and reducing costs and uncertainty. 
More recently there is a recognition that settlements may reflect more accurately the 
views of the parties, and allow more innovative and creative solutions that the 
regulatory commissions may not be able to achieve by litigation. Thus, settlements are 
not so much, or not only, a way of reducing the transactions costs of achieving the 
same outcome as litigation. Rather, they are a means of achieving a different outcome 
than litigation, and one that is preferred by the parties involved.1 Wang (2004) has 
documented this feature of settlements at FERC. Doucet and Littlechild (2006a) find 
similar results at the National Energy Board in Canada. 
 
Previous papers (Littlechild 2003, 2006) present evidence from the experience of the 
Florida Public Service Commission (FPSC) and the Office of Public Counsel (OPC) 
in Florida, particularly on the extent and effect of the stipulations and settlements 
negotiated and signed by OPC after its creation in 1974. During 1976-2002, over 30 
per cent of earnings reviews in the telephone, gas and electricity sectors were settled 
by stipulations involving the Office of Public Counsel but only 5 per cent of other 
cases. Over three quarters of the rate reductions associated with earnings reviews 
derived from these stipulations, and in the decade 1976-86 the proportion was over 95 
per cent. The average value of a rate reduction was seven times higher with a 
stipulation than without. Only 1 per cent of the rate increases associated with 
company requests derived from these stipulations. On average a stipulation provided 
for a lower proportion of the requested rate increase than a litigated outcome did 
(about one third compared to one half).  
 
These findings are consistent with the findings of Holburn and Spiller (2002) that 
participation of consumer advocates (like OPC) in regulation leads to lower allowed 
rates of return and less initiation of rate reviews by utilities. (See also Holburn and 
Vanden Bergh (2006) on the creation of such bodies.) However, those studies do not 
explore the role of such advocates in settlements versus litigation, nor do they look at 
the nature and content of any settlements. 
 
 
                                                 
1 Doucet and Littlechild (2006b) trace the development of legal and economic thinking. For more 
detailed discussion, see for example Morgan (1978), Krieger (1995), Buchmann and Tongeren (1996) 
and Schultz (1999). Littlechild and Skerk (2004a,b) show how users rather than the regulatory body 
have been responsible for transmission network development in Argentina. 
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Previous research findings, and economic (public choice) theory generally, suggest 
certain broad predictions about stipulations. The transactions costs of these 
stipulations are presumably not significant relative to the benefits, and they must 
embody gains from trade that both parties prefer to the likely outcome of regulation. 
The stipulations therefore depend upon commitments from the parties that the 
Commission is unable to give, and/or they embody different values and decisions than 
those of the Commission. Nevertheless, the stipulations must be sufficiently 
acceptable to the Commission that it decides to approve rather than reject them. 
 
The present paper looks in more detail at the content of the stipulations that have been 
agreed in the electricity sector in Florida. The aim is to understand why they were 
made and to identify differences in outcome compared to what would have happened 
had the decisions been left to the Commission and staff through the litigated process. 
This includes assessing whether the agreed rates are higher or lower than they 
otherwise would have been, whether one class of customer benefited more than 
another, whether the stipulations differ in other respects from regulatory decisions, 
how the utilities were enabled to agree rate reductions and what benefits the 
companies derived from the stipulations.  
 
Section 2 gives some background on utility regulation in Florida and on the electricity 
sector there. Section 3 examines the costs of litigation that might be saved by 
settlements. Section 4 summarises the main benefits to customers in the dozen 
settlements in the electricity sector, and assesses how far these benefits would have 
been achieved otherwise. Section 5 examines the method of rate reductions and the 
impact on the distribution of these benefits and whether industrial users benefited 
disproportionately. Section 6 looks at the potential benefits of stipulations to utilities, 
including the possibility of actions outside the scope of the FPSC. Section 7 reviews 
the changes to FPSC accounting policy that stipulations have embodied. Section 8 
traces the evolution from rate of return regulation to revenue sharing incentive plans. 
Section 9 discusses rate structure and quality of supply issues. Section 10 concludes.  
 
2. Background 
 
2.1 Regulation in Florida 
 
The Florida Public Service Commission (FPSC) regulates the telephone, natural gas, 
electric power and water industries in that state. In 2001 the PSC regulated 5 electric 
companies, 7 natural gas utilities and 207 water/waste water utilities, all investor-
owned, and had more limited regulatory oversight over the telecommunications 
sector. It had 386 authorised staff positions and an annual budget of approximately 
$27 million for fiscal year 2001-2. Littlechild (2006) provides more detail on the 
regulatory framework in Florida. 
 
The State of Florida set up the Office of Public Counsel (OPC) in 1974. Its duty is to 
represent the citizens of Florida in utility matters, mainly before the PSC. The Public 
Counsel is appointed or reappointed annually. After three appointments as Public 
Counsel in the first four years, a single incumbent (Mr Jack Shreve) held office for 
over 25 years, until June 2003. The OPC presently has a staff of about 15, and an 
annual budget of about $2.5 m. This means that the OPC has less than one twentieth 
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the staff of the PSC, and its budget is about one tenth that of the PSC. Consultants and 
expert witnesses are taken on for each case as needed.2  
 
Normal regulatory procedure includes a process of hearings and litigation. The utility 
may apply for a rate increase or the FPSC may decide to review the situation with a 
view to a possible rate decrease. The OPC and other interested parties such as 
customers or competitors can also apply to FPSC for a review. Once FPSC opens a 
docket, the utility and the OPC and other parties that are accepted as intervenors 
normally file and counter-file testimony. There is provision for the recognised parties 
to seek further information. In the absence of a settlement there is a formal hearing 
involving cross-examination of witnesses, after which FPSC makes its decision on the 
evidence presented. If a settlement is agreed, this normally happens just before the 
hearing. FPSC has to approve or reject the settlement. In both cases decisions are 
taken in the light of advice from staff.  
 
FPSC’s policy has been to encourage settlements. For example, in FPC 1987 it quoted 
Florida law as encouraging settlement.3 It argued that approval of the parties was 
“highly instructive” in assessing the public interest.4 Parties were periodically 
encouraged to consider settlement. 5
 
2.2 The impact of stipulations 
 
Figure 1 shows the nominal base rate increases and decreases approved by the FPSC 
over the last 35 years.6 The figure covers the electricity, gas and telephone sectors, 
with electricity accounting on average for nearly half the amounts involved. Rate 
increases gradually rose from a negligible level in the mid-1960s to a peak around 
1980 then fell back to a negligible level in the mid-1990s. Rate decreases were at a 
very low level in the 1960s and 1970s but rose sharply by the end of the period.  
                                                 
2 In June 2003 the OPC issued a report on its activities over the period up to Mr Shreve’s retirement. 
State of Florida Public Counsel Activity Report, June 30 2003. Of the 26 pages, 3 ½ refer to its 
activities concerning telephone utilities, 7 to electricity and gas utilities, and 15 ½ to water and 
wastewater utilities. 
3 “It is the policy of the law to encourage and favour the compromise and settlement of controversies 
when such settlement is entered into fairly and in good faith by competent parties, and is not procured 
by fraud or overreaching. … It is in the interest of the state as well as the parties themselves that there 
should be an end to litigation.” 10 Fla. Jur. 2d Compromise, Accord and Release, § 9. 
4 “To the above criterion we must add: Is the Stipulation in the public interest and are the resulting rates 
fair and reasonable?” It noted that “in cases such as this, the interests of the ratepayers and the utility 
encompass our primary concern”. In this case the five parties to the Stipulation well represented those 
interests. “Their separate determinations that approval of this Stipulation is in their best interest is 
highly instructive, because they, in a broad sense, collectively represent the public interest this 
Commission is charged with protecting.” 
5 E.g. “You need to know that my philosophy, and the philosophy of the Commissioners, as articulated 
in every order that we’ve issued in this case, is that resolution in an informal fashion serves the public 
interest. So I hope that you will take every opportunity to explore the feasibility of settlement on some 
of these issues.” Chairman Jaber, Prehearing conference February 15, 2002, p. 7, in GPC 2002 (docket 
010949). 
6 Before 1978, all allowed rate increases and required rate reductions were in principle of a permanent 
nature. From 1978 onwards, there were numerous one-time rate reductions that variously took the form 
of refunds, rate base reductions, and applications to storm damage reserves, environmental clean-up 
costs, debt refinancing costs or an escrow account. To enable comparisons between decisions, and for 
ease of discussion, the figures cited for rate reductions comprise the permanent reductions plus one-
quarter times the one-time reductions. The figures are total for each five year period in nominal terms. 
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Figure 1 Base rate increases and decreases in Florida utility sector, 1965-2000  
Source: Littlechild (2006) 
 
The graph also shows the contribution of the three dozen stipulations in which the 
OPC participated. 7 These accounted for virtually none of the rate increases but for 
almost all of the rate decreases.8 Two questions naturally arise. Would the outcomes 
have been the same in the absence of stipulations involving the OPC? And if the OPC 
secured greater rate reductions than would otherwise have been achieved, why did the 
utilities agree to these settlements, and what did the utilities get out of the process?  
 
Since the meetings of interested parties are confidential, there is no public knowledge 
of what is said therein. However, the stipulations specify the terms of the agreement 
and sometimes contain some indication of why the parties think the proposal is 
reasonable. There is usually a written record of the analyses and recommendations of 
staff. FPSC, which has to be satisfied that the proposed settlement is just and 
reasonable, will give some explanation of the reasons for its decision. It is possible to 
look at previous FPSC decisions and actions (or inactions), and sometimes possible to 
compare the stipulated outcomes with the initial positions of the parties. This paper 
explores all these sources. 
 
2.3 Structure of the electricity sector in Florida 
 
The electricity market is not open to competition in Florida. The four main companies 
are vertically integrated, with their own generation plant as well as transmission and 
distribution lines. 9 The rate cases examined here are taken from a database 
                                                 
7 Until the mid-1970s, PSC staff and companies negotiated many settlements that appeared simply as 
amounts in a subsequent order of the PSC. Other participants were seldom involved. There was no 
signed document and usually no reference to any meetings or agreements. After the creation of the 
OPC the process was formalised and the settlements embodied in written agreements called 
stipulations. 
8 The major disparity around 1990 was accounted for by a single large telephone case (Southern Bell 
Telephone 1988, docket 871401)) where the parties attempted a settlement but failed to achieve it. 
9 The fifth company, Florida Public Utilities Co, owns distribution assets only, in two separate 
locations (Fernandina Beach and Marianna). 
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maintained at FPSC that refers primarily to base rates.10 Base rates cover the costs of 
building and operating generation plant, and transmission and distribution lines. Base 
rates exclude fuel costs (which are subject to pass-through arrangements). Over time, 
other elements such as conservation costs, power purchase costs, certain 
environmental costs and new security costs have also been excluded from base rates.  
 
Table 1 gives some measures of the different sizes of the five investor-owned electric 
utilities in Florida. The largest company is Florida Power and Light (FPL). It would 
typically be involved in base rate increases or reductions measured in hundreds of 
millions of dollars. The next three companies are Florida Power Corporation (FPC) 
now known as Progress Energy Florida (PEF), Tampa Electric Company (TECO) and 
Gulf Power Company (GPC). They would be dealing in tens of millions of dollars. 
The smallest company (Florida Public Utilities Company) had no case involving more 
than one million dollars until recently. It has not participated in any settlements and is 
not considered further herein. 
 
Table 1 Relative sizes of the electricity companies in Florida 
Company Florida 
Power and 
Light 
(FPL) 
Florida 
Power 
Corporation 
(FPC)* 
Tampa 
Electric 
Company 
(TECO) 
Gulf Power 
Company 
(GPC) 
Florida 
Public 
Utilities 
Company
Rate Base $8.4bn $3.5bn $2.3bn $1.1bn  
Number of 
Employees 
9898 4393 2823 1309 350** 
Number of 
customers 
3.9m 1.4m 0.6m 0.4m 0.055m 
Percentage 
of customers 
in Florida  
62% 22% 9% 6% 1% 
*now Progress Energy Florida (PEF)  
 
Source: FPSC except ** from company website 
 
2.4 Settlements in the electricity sector 
 
The electricity sector in Florida was characterised by modest rate reductions in the 
1960s then a series of substantial rate increases in the 1970s and early 1980s. The 
increases reflected a variety of factors, including inflation, the oil crisis, system 
expansion and the building of new generation plant including nuclear. In this context 
the OPC was created in 1974. 
 
Figure 2 shows graphically whether the base rates of the four utilities have been 
covered by litigated cases (denoted L) or stipulated settlements (denoted S) over the 
last thirty years. The widths of the four columns correspond broadly to the relative 
                                                 
10 More precisely, the database is thought to include all FPSC decisions associated with 1) increases or 
decreases in base rates, 2) changes in authorised return on equity (ROE), and 3) the results of decisions 
that dealt with earnings or overearnings. I have added two related stipulations that do not appear in this 
database but nonetheless have implications for base rates, in the first case specifying the costs that 
should go into base rates and in the second case freezing these base rates. 
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sizes of the utility companies. The depth of each rectangle indicates the number of 
years covered by that case or stipulation. 
 
Two features stand out. First, stipulations have gradually taken over from litigated 
cases. In the first decade 1976-1985 there were a total of 20 base rate cases involving 
the four major electricity companies; all of them were litigated in the traditional way. 
In the next decade 1986-1995 there were a further 20 base rate cases, of which 17 
were litigated and 3 were stipulated settlements. In the most recent decade 1996-2005 
there were only 10 base rate cases, of which all but one were stipulated settlements, 
and in addition a further two stipulations (denoted S*) covered related base rate 
matters.  
 
Figure 2 Litigated cases and stipulated settlements in Florida electricity sector 
 
Year GPC TECO FPC FPL 
1976         
1977 L L L L 
1978 L       
1979       L 
1980 L L L   
1981       L 
1982 L L L L 
1983 L L     
1984     L L 
1985 L L     
1986     S   
1987     S   
1988 L L   L 
1989   L(2)   L 
1990 L (2) L   L 
1991       L 
1992   L L   
1993 S L   L 
1994   L     
1995   L     
1996   S(2)     
1997     S*(2)   
1998         
1999 S     S 
2000   S     
2001         
2002 L   S S 
2003         
2004         
2005    S S 
2006        
2007        
2008        
2009        
 
Source: FPSC database, plus S*(2) added by author 
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Second, stipulations typically last longer than litigated cases. The latter determine 
rates until such time as another case is brought. This could be as soon as the next year. 
In contrast, the stipulations began to determine rates for three or four years ahead.  
 
A third significant feature of the stipulations is the refunds and rate reductions they 
brought about. The OPC had begun to achieve rate reductions in the telephone sector, 
typically by means of stipulations, in the period up to 1986.11 Now it appears there 
was scope for this in electricity. 
Table 2 Electricity sector stipulations 
Year Company 
Docket 
Number 
of 
signatories 
Base rate change Other features 
1986 FPC 
861096 
2 $54m refund 1 year rate freeze 
1987 FPC 
870220 
5 $121.5m reduction  
$18.5m refund 
1 year profit sharing  
1993 GPC 
930139 
3 No change 1 year rate freeze 
1996a TECO 
950379 
3 $25m refund 3 year rate freeze 
1996b TECO 
960409 
3 + $25m refund + 1 year rate freeze 
1997a FPC* 
970096 
3 No change Specification of cost 
treatment  
to avoid rate increase      
1997b FPC* 
970261 
8 No change 4 year rate freeze 
1999 FPL 
990067 
4 $350m reduction 3 year revenue sharing 
($217.8m) 
1999 GPC 
990947 
4 $10m reduction 3 year revenue sharing 
2000 TECO 
950379 
3 $13m +$6.3m 
refunds 
 
2002 FPL 
001148 
8 $250m reduction 4 year revenue sharing 
($14m) 
2002 FPC 
000824 
6 $125m reduction 4 year revenue sharing 
($50m) 
2005 FPL 
050045 
9 Rate freeze 4 year revenue sharing 
2005 PEF  
(ex-FPC) 
050078 
10 Rate freeze 4 year revenue sharing 
Total     $856.5m rate reductions + $141.8m refunds + $281.8m revenue sharing 
Source: Dockets on the website of the Florida Public Service Commission at 
http://www.psc.state.fl.us/dockets/cms/  
                                                 
11 Over the eight years 1978 to 1986, OPC (together with FPSC staff) had agreed some 19 stipulations 
with telephone companies. Four of these agreed small rate increases, typically of about $0.5m in 
response to company requests of about $2m. The rest involved more significant rate reductions for 
over-earnings. Southern Bell, the largest telephone company in Florida, agreed to reduce its rates by 
$31m in 1980 and again in 1986, and to make one-time refunds of $55m, $12m, $16m and $189m on 
these and other occasions. The stipulations with other telephone companies agreed one-off rate 
reductions or refunds ranging from $15,000 up to $16m, averaging about $6m each. 
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The first stipulation between OPC and an electricity utility was in 1986, and secured a 
$54m refund from Florida Power Corporation (FPC). Over the next two decades the 
OPC and the four main electric utilities negotiated and agreed fourteen stipulations 
related to base rates. Table 2 summarises the headline terms that these stipulations 
embodied. In total they delivered over $1 bn of benefits to customers, comprising rate 
freezes, over $850m of rate reductions (that is, ‘permanent’ reductions in annual 
allowed revenues that will continue annually until otherwise modified), over $140m 
of immediate one-time refunds, plus over $280m from revenue-sharing provisions.  
None of the stipulations involved base rate increases. 12  
 
The number of signatories varied from 2 to 10, with the median being 4. This includes 
OPC and the utility, so there are typically two additional intervenor parties but there 
have been up to 8 others. The averages over individual companies are GPC 3.5, 
TECO 3.0, FPC/PEF 5.7 and FPL 7.0 signatories. Thus, not surprisingly, the larger 
the company, the greater the number of interested parties tend to participate as 
intervenors. This does not appear to have hindered the ability to reach agreement on 
stipulations. Discussion with parties involved and transcripts of hearings suggests that 
OPC made most of the running, with other parties indicating that they supported 
OPC’s position on many issues.  
 
FPSC approved all the stipulations. Very occasionally it seems that the wording or 
content of the stipulation was tailored to reflect a potential FPSC concern.13
 
3. Settlements and the costs of regulatory proceedings 
 
Stipulations frequently make reference to avoiding the time, uncertainty and cost of 
continued litigation.14 However, in Florida stipulations are typically signed only a few 
days before the assigned date for the administrative hearing. That hearing might be 
scheduled to take only a week or two and FPSC would normally issue its decision 
shortly thereafter. So any time saving is small, and any uncertainty would resolve 
itself in a matter of weeks.15  
 
                                                 
12 During 2006, stipulations to resolve the treatment of storm damage costs were under active 
discussion with two utilities. In the event, a stipulation was not agreed with FPL (docket 060038) and 
FPSC authorised by a monthly surcharge on bills to finance a bond issue. OPC later agreed a 
stipulation with GPC (docket 060154) that did not involve any increase in the existing surcharge. It is 
not clear whether there was a difference in the financial position of the two companies that enabled 
GPC to recover more of its storm costs in its existing base rates than FPL could. 
13 For example, one element of the GPC 2006 stipulation (previous footnote) was modified after staff 
expressed concern (later endorsed by FPSC) that it unacceptably delegated (to the utility) FPSC’s 
statutory authority to authorise a change in rates. 
14 E.g. “This Stipulation and Settlement avoids the time, expense and uncertainty associated with 
adversarial litigation in keeping with the Florida Public Service Commission’s long-standing policy 
and practice of encouraging parties in contested proceedings to settle issues whenever possible.” (GPC 
1999)  “[T]he parties are entering into this Settlement Agreement to avoid the expense and length of 
further legal proceedings and the uncertainty and risk inherent in any litigation”. (TECO 2000) 
15 Management and investors may nonetheless value the reduction of uncertainty, especially on terms 
acceptable to the utility. E.g. “Although this outcome is below the original request from FPL, we 
believe coming to a solution without a long drawn-out potentially litigated process is a more 
constructive outcome and removes a major overhang for the stock.” UBS Utilities 23 August 2005, 
commenting on the resolution of FPL 2005. 
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Although stipulations save some costs, this is only a proportion of the total costs of 
litigation. For example, the costs of litigation that are normally incurred before a 
stipulation is considered include the costs of preparing the case, getting the relevant 
information, completing Minimum Filing Requirements (MFRs) and participating in 
the discovery process. These costs are considered to account for up to three quarters 
of the total cost. The additional costs that would be incurred if litigation went ahead 
and that would be saved if a stipulation were agreed include the costs of the hearing 
itself, the briefing that precedes it, and the likelihood of an appeal thereafter. These 
latter costs account for somewhat over a quarter of the total. The parties would need 
to brief witnesses and prepare testimony in the event that there was no agreement on a 
stipulation. Such agreement is generally reached only a very short time before the 
hearing is due to take place, and agreeing the stipulation itself requires intensive 
participation at senior level.  Thus, the costs saved by agreeing a stipulation rather 
than going to litigation are of the order of a quarter of the total costs of litigating a 
case, or at most a little more.  
 
3.1 Illustration: the largest electricity utility 
 
To assess and illustrate the potential cost savings from a settlement, consider first the 
case of Florida Light and Power (FPL), the largest electricity utility in the state, and 
the FPL 2002 settlement which involved the largest electricity revenue reduction. I 
understand that the utility filed projected rate case expenses at about $5m. Some 
might say that such expenses do not include all the costs, including those of executive 
time, and that the full cost might be about double the filed expense. Others might 
argue that this projection was excessive.16  In the event, “FPL has stated in its press 
release that a million dollars in rate case costs will be saved by the Stipulation.” 17
 
Contrast this figure with the $250m rate reduction in this stipulation. This reduction 
applied for four years (and provided for one-time refunds as well), so the total value 
of the reduction was of the order of $1 billion. 
 
The announced cost saving was thus of the order of one tenth of one percent of the 
stipulated rate reduction. In turn, the rate reduction was an order of magnitude less 
than the total annual revenue covered by the stipulation. The calculations might be 
slightly different in other FPL cases or for other companies. 18 However, it is 
implausible that cost savings alone are driving utilities to stipulations that dispose of 
revenues that are three or four orders of magnitude greater than the regulatory costs 
saved. 
 
3.2 Illustration: a small intervenor 
 
                                                 
16 The figure of $5m was by some way the highest ever proposed for this category of expense, and 
since legal fees constituted some $3m of the $5m the reasonableness of these could have been 
challenged. 
17 Case background 10 March 1999 in FPL 1999. 
18 In 1999 the FPL stipulation provided for $350m reduction for 3 years, total value about $1bn.  In 
2005 the FPL stipulation provided for no rate change over 4 years, but the two sides had earlier argued 
for increases and reductions of the order of $0.6bn, so an increase or reduction worth over $2bn was 
involved. Proportionate cost savings from settlement might be a little higher for the smaller companies 
in the Florida electricity sector, but probably not much higher. 
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At the other extreme, consider the situation of an intervenor in the same case (FPL 
2002). Lee County is a large purchaser of electricity for its local government offices. 
It was concerned what a rate case might imply after 18 years without review. FPSC 
staff had asked FPL to calculate and file what rate changes would be needed to bring 
all rate classes to parity. FPL had not yet filed this calculation but an initial cost study 
indicated possible rate increases of 10% to 18% for the two largest rate classes. A 
rough calculation suggested that Lee County might be exposed to an increase 
somewhere in the range $200,000 to $700,000 even if there were no change in FPL’s 
total revenue requirements.  
 
Lee County therefore appointed a representative to monitor the development of the 
rate case and, if necessary, to organise witnesses and to put forward Lee County’s 
case, and to ensure that transitional rules were applied to limit changes in particular 
rates. These rules were well established but not always simple.19  
 
The cost of such representation would depend on the extent of input required. For an 
intervenor to be represented on all issues in a large case (85 issues in one case) and to 
hire top quality consultants might cost up to, say, $300,000 to $500,000. But it is 
possible to participate for much less than that. For $10,000 to $15,000 it would be 
possible to hire a representative to take positions on a limited number of issues, and to 
be represented in the hearing and associated discussions. For an additional $5,000 to 
$10,000 it would be possible to hire an expert witness.  
 
In FPL 2002, OPC and FPL carried out the bulk of the testimony work and 
negotiations. After most of the testimony was filed, Lee County’s representative was 
contacted to say that a settlement was under consideration, involving an across-the-
board decrease in rates. This would mean a reduction of the order of $200,000 for Lee 
County, rather than a possible increase of the same or greater amount. Lee County 
accepted.20
 
A large electricity user such as Lee County might therefore find it worthwhile to 
spend a few tens of thousands of dollars in participating actively in a rate case, if this 
could avoid or mitigate a potential rate increase of the order of a few hundreds of 
thousands of dollars. The savings from a settlement rather than the full litigated 
process would therefore be a few thousand dollars, contrasted with the total size of its 
                                                 
19 They provided, for example, that if the system average was a rate decrease, then no individual class 
of customer could be given a rate increase. Similarly, if the system average was a rate increase, then no 
rate class could be given a decrease. There were also more detailed restrictions: if a 5% increase was 
indicated for one rate class but the system average was a 1% increase, then the maximum increase in 
that one class was 1 ½% increase. 
20 One other intervenor, South Florida Hospital and Healthcare Association, declined to sign the 
stipulation. It had argued for an aggregate decrease in rates of $475m instead of the $250m agreed in 
the stipulation. It was rumoured that, if the case had gone to litigation, OPC would have filed for a 
decrease of a similar order of magnitude. By deferring filing, OPC was not seen to settle for less. South 
Florida Hospital and Healthcare Association subsequently appealed the FPSC order to the Florida 
Supreme Court. OPC argued against the appeal, on the grounds that reopening the issue would mean 
that the generality of customers could lose the benefits of the $250m decrease already agreed. In the 
event, the Supreme Court held that the SFHHA did not have sufficient standing since it had not itself 
applied for a rate case. (SFHHA v Javer, 887 So. 2d 1210, 1214 Fl. 2004) In consequence, some 
organisations have subsequently applied for rate cases in order to give themselves standing in such 
matters. 
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electricity bill likely to be in the millions. Again, there is a difference of some three to 
four orders of magnitude.  
 
The same argument applies to OPC. Suppose it cost the OPC about $100,000 to put 
on a litigated case. A saving of even half of this ($25,000 to $50,000) is not what 
drives the OPC to settlement in cases where the impacts on customers are measured in 
hundreds of millions of dollars. For all parties, the purpose of settlement is to get 
something different and better than what litigation would yield, not to get the same 
outcome at slightly lower cost.  
 
4. Electricity stipulations: the extent of benefits to customers 
 
4.1 Role of OPC 
 
How far are the rate changes, rate freezes and other outcomes in Table 2 due to the 
actions of the OPC, in particular to the stipulations that it signed? How far would 
these freezes, reductions and refunds have happened anyway?  
 
A first cut at this is to look at which of the cases were initiated by OPC. In seven of 
the twelve cases, FPSC was already in process of dealing with the issue. But in the 
other five cases, the issue was opened or reopened by OPC filing for a review or 
protesting a previous FPSC decision. These latter five cases21 accounted for 37.6% of 
rate reductions ($360/956.5m), 68% of refunds ($98.3/141.8m) and 77.3% of the 
revenue sharing payments ($217.8/281.8m).  
 
As a rough approximation, assume that a revenue reduction lasts on average for three 
years, so give it three times the weight of the one-time refunds and revenue sharing 
payments. Then the weighted average is $1396.1/3293.1m = 42.4%. On this basis, 
OPC was responsible for opening or reopening cases that accounted for $1.4 bn of 
customer benefits measured in terms of electricity rate reductions and refunds, 
constituting around 40 per cent of the total of such benefits.   
 
However, this calculation does not measure the precise impact of stipulations 
involving OPC. Regardless of who opened or reopened a case, would FPSC have 
reached essentially the same outcome in the absence of a stipulation, or did the 
stipulation make a significant difference? We therefore examine the stipulations in 
more detail, together with the background to each of them. 
 
4.2 Customer benefits in the largest case 
 
Consider first the stipulation FPL 1999, which embodied the largest rate reduction 
and the most explicit set of calculations about this reduction. The background was that 
in 1995, 1997 and December 1998 FPSC accepted FPL proposals to use excess 
earnings to write off deficits and regulatory assets (such as stranded costs). OPC and 
others objected to the last decision and petitioned for a full rate case. Then FPL 
agreed with OPC (inter alia) to reduce base rates by $350m instead. In advising on the 
stipulation, FPSC staff were split. Primary staff (reflecting the view of the most senior 
official) recommended that the stipulation be approved. They said “We recognise that, 
                                                 
21 These latter five cases were FPC 1986, TECO 1996, FPL 1999, GPC 1999, TECO 2000. 
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at the conclusion of a full rate case, a greater rate reduction is possible.” Alternative 
staff, opposing the stipulation, said that “Based upon an historic or prospective view 
of earnings, …. greater rate reductions would be likely if the Commission proceeded 
to a full rate requirements proceeding”. (Both emphases added.)  
 
It may seem ironic that the stipulation that embodied the largest ever rate reduction to 
customers led to the most significant questioning and quantification of customer 
benefits by FPSC staff involved. This may well reflect the fact that the largest 
reduction was associated with the most significant departure to date from previous 
regulatory practice. Because of the contrary views and detailed calculations in this 
case, it is useful to look at the calculations in some detail. 
 
Appendix 1 shows that staff made two calculations. The first, based on a historical 
view of costs, estimated the scope for rate reductions at $515m. The second 
calculation, based on a prospective view of earnings, estimated the scope at $556m. 
 
The stipulation provided for a rate reduction of $350m plus refunds when revenues 
exceeded specified levels. Over the three years 1999 to 2001 these refunds were 
$22.8m, $108.8m and $86.2m, an average of $73m per year. So for purposes of 
comparison the stipulation may be assumed to embody an effective reduction of 
$350m + $73m = $423m per year (although the size of the ex post refunds could not 
be known ex ante).  
 
Compare this stipulated and (ex post) achieved rate reduction of about $423m with 
the implied staff estimates of $515m on a historic view and $556m on a prospective 
view. Did OPC settle for between $92m and $133m less than the Commission would 
have granted if the case had gone to a full hearing? Put another way, would the 
Commission have decreed rate reductions and a sharing scheme that yielded in total 
something in the range $515m to $556m, representing some 22% to 31% more than 
the $423m outcome of the settlement? Or, if the FPSC had to determine a rate 
reduction without a revenue-sharing scheme, would it have decreed a rate reduction 
some 47% to 59% greater than the $350m provided in the stipulation? 
 
Neither staff estimate was subject to challenge by the utility. Neither estimate makes 
allowance for uncertainty associated with future costs and other events. Alternative 
staff’s calculations claiming that a greater reduction was “likely” were of the nature of 
an initial pre-hearing bargaining position. Primary staff claimed only that a higher rate 
reduction was “possible”. This view also noted that it would take 8 to 12 months 
before a full rate case would take effect. The “main reason Primary Staff recommends 
approval of the stipulation is that it results in immediate and significant savings to all 
of FPL’s ratepayers.”  
 
What stance would FPSC have taken after a full proceeding? Both staff estimates 
assume that FPSC would not wish to allow additional amortization. Yet additional 
amortization was a policy to which FPSC was committed. Ever since 1995 it had 
consistently written down deficits and regulatory assets instead of reducing rates. I 
have heard it conjectured that by 1999 FPSC was ready to consider rate reductions, 
and to that end was about to ask the company to file information on which to base an 
order. But this was not reflected in the FPSC order of December 1998, only three 
months earlier, which again decided to write off further assets and not to reduce rates.  
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A distinctive feature of this stipulation, that must have been a factor in FPL’s 
agreement, was the move from earnings sharing to revenue sharing. This was a 
revolutionary approach. It was strongly opposed by both sets of staff and seems 
unlikely to have emerged in the event of a traditional hearings process (as discussed 
below). 
 
Most telling, and of course most critical, was the stance of FPSC itself in this actual 
case. If it thought that a full proceeding could have yielded larger benefits to 
customers, it could have rejected the stipulation. It chose not to. It agonised over none 
of the points and calculations made by staff. It said simply that the stipulation would 
resolve all the issues in OPC’s petition and provide immediate and substantial benefits 
for customers, and therefore should be approved.  
 
It is therefore plausible to conclude a) that in the absence of OPC action, there would 
have been no rate reduction at all, and b) that once OPC had raised the issue, if the 
case had gone to hearings there would have been much less scope for rate reduction 
than the stipulation achieved. At least some of the excess earnings would have been 
applied to additional amortization, and without the inducement of revenue sharing 
FPL would have argued for lower rate reductions. 
 
4.4 Impact of other stipulations on rate reductions and refunds 
 
Are other stipulations broadly consistent with these conclusions? The first case (FPC 
1986) is particularly interesting and revealing for the attitude and statement of FPSC. 
A reduction in federal tax rate was expected. This would not have been passed 
through to customers because FPC was earning below its authorised ROE, so FPSC 
had not envisaged taking any action. OPC filed to reduce the ROE and to reduce rates 
by $46.3m. OPC and FPC then agreed a refund of $54m for 1987. The reasons for this 
are discussed later. FPSC pointed out that this refund was higher than any electricity 
sector refund to date. (The previous largest was $14m by FPL, a larger company, in 
1979.) FPSC explicitly weighed up the alternatives and concluded that it could not 
secure a more attractive deal for customers in the time available: “Hence we believe 
this bird in the hand is worth taking.” 
 
Appendix 2 examines the records of the remaining cases to ascertain whether the 
stipulations embodied lower rates for customers than a traditional litigated proceeding 
is likely to have achieved. (This also gives a useful overview of the cases.) It attempts 
a classification of the stipulated outcome into one (or sometimes two) of four 
categories: would Not otherwise have been secured (N), Greater than otherwise (G), 
Less than otherwise (L) or Earlier than otherwise (E). No cases suggest that any rate 
reduction or refund was later than otherwise.  
 
Table 3 summarises the classification of outcomes. On this basis, all the ‘permanent’ 
rate reductions, refunds and sharing were greater or earlier than they otherwise would 
have been, and some of them might not have been achieved at all without stipulations. 
Note that these summary calculations give zero weight to those stipulations (GPC 
1993, FPC 1997a,b, FPL 2005, PEF 2005) that held prices constant when increases 
might otherwise have been expected, and therefore perhaps understate the value of the 
stipulations in bringing immediate benefits to customers. 
 14
 
The final column totals these benefits by conservatively weighting each rate reduction 
by the number of years covered by the stipulation. On this basis, the total revenue 
reduction during these two decades was over three billion dollars. All of this reduction 
was greater or earlier than would otherwise have occurred, and it is arguable that up to 
three quarters of it would never have occurred at all without the OPC stipulation.  
 
 
Table 3 Nature of benefits from stipulations 
Nature of benefit  Reduction 
$m 
Refund  
$m 
Sharing  
$m  
Weighted Total 
$m 
Not otherwise achieved (N)  50  50 
Greater than otherwise (G)  37.8 217.8 255.6 
Less than otherwise (L)     
Earlier than otherwise (E)     
N/E 10 54  84 
N/G 721.5  29 2200.5 
G/E 125  35 535 
     
Total 856.5 141.8 281.8 3125.1 
 
Source: Appendix 2. 
 
These classifications are of course subjective, but they are based on the historical 
context and the evidence of the FPSC reports and decisions. The evaluation does not 
extend to possible increases in other rates. (Some of the stipulations allowed utilities 
to pass new costs through fuel adjustment and other clauses, instead of via base rates.) 
Nor does it cover the possible longer term impact, nor seek to evaluate whether the 
outcomes were ‘better’ than otherwise. What it does suggest is that stipulations 
involving OPC led unequivocally to avoidance of price increases and greater 
immediate price reductions, refunds, and sharing benefits for electricity customers 
than would otherwise have occurred.  
 
5. The nature and distribution of benefits to customers 
 
5.1 The method of rate reduction 
 
Did all classes of customer derive comparable benefits from these rate reductions and 
refunds? Holburn and Spiller (2002) found evidence that participation of consumer 
advocates tended to lead to lower allowed rates of return but also to relatively lower 
industrial rates: in other words, industrial consumers tended to benefit more than 
residential consumers. Is there evidence of that in the Florida electricity sector?  
 
As it happens, the very first electricity stipulation (FPC 1986) touched on this point. 
OPC and FPC agreed to let FPSC decide how to implement the $54m credit. Staff 
proposed to allocate it among rate classes in the same way as the revenue requirement 
was determined in the last cost of service study, and for ease of administration they 
proposed to use base revenue instead of rate base. FPSC commented that this slightly 
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favoured Interruptible users but that this was not unfair since those users had been 
slightly disadvantaged in the previous decision.22
 
5.2 Demand versus energy basis 
 
Later stipulations did not leave it to FPSC staff, but instead specified the method of 
rate reduction to be used. Staff expressed concern on at least four occasions that the 
method agreed was more favourable to large industrial users than to smaller users. 
The first such case explains the concern. 
 
TECO 1996a provided, inter alia, for a one-time refund of $25m. Staff were split on 
the proposal. The following was one of the objections of alternative staff: 
“Alternative staff has serious concerns about the proposed method of distributing the proposed 
refunds. The stipulation provides for both the initial $25 million and subsequent refunds to be 
refunded on an energy basis, rather than on a demand basis. Applying a refund factor to kWh 
usage results in large industrial (especially non-firm) customers receiving a greater share of 
the refund than merited based on the cost allocations underlying the rates which generated the 
overearnings.  … Allocation of the refund on a demand basis is more consistent with the way 
costs were allocated in setting base rates.”  23  
FPSC nonetheless approved this stipulation, citing the views of primary staff which 
did not mention this issue. 
 
Appendix 3 summarises the other stipulations that embodied a similar approach and 
engendered a similar concern by staff. It shows that FPSC’s previous practice was to 
relate non-energy rates to allocated cost, and to increase and reduce rates on a 
maximum demand basis. There seems little doubt that, in the absence of the 
stipulations, FPSC would have continued that practice. It would periodically have 
reset rates to reflect allocated costs more closely, and would not have introduced rate 
reductions on an energy basis. The stipulations therefore changed the allocation of 
rate reductions, in favour of the larger industrial users. This change started with 
TECO in 1996 and was extended to FPL and GPC in 1999. It was effectively 
maintained at FPL (and perhaps FPC) in 2002 by across-the-board reductions in lieu 
of revising the rate structure. 
   
Appendix 3 also shows that staff sometimes sought to quantify the impact of the 
different method for allocating rate reductions. In the first case their conjectures seem, 
in retrospect, to have overestimated the extent of the transfer between rate classes. In 
a later case (FPL 1999) a more considered calculation estimates that a demand-based 
                                                 
22 “Using base revenue, rather than rate base, as the allocator does give the Interruptible class a higher 
percentage of the refund (2.28% rather than 1.52%). But since their rate of return was left above the 
system rate of return in the Company’s last rate case this is a reasonable request. The converse is true 
for the General Service Large Demand class, but again, their rate of return was left below the system 
average in the Company’s last rate case.” 
23 Alternative staff continued “If it is appropriate to allocate the earnings on an energy basis, it could be 
argued that it is appropriate to allocate the cost of Polk [a new generating unit] on energy as well. / In 
addition, there is an inherent unfairness in giving a smaller share of the refund resulting from over-
recovery of base rate costs to the customers who will likely be asked to shoulder the bulk of any 
stranded generation costs in a competitive environment. Large customers are likely to have the most 
opportunities to utilise alternative electric suppliers, and, as a result, “strand” utility plant. Since the 
bulk of stranded costs will be production related, any refund of base rates should be made on a demand 
basis to mitigate the impact of stranded costs.” Alternate Staff Analysis, pp. 9-10, Memorandum: Case 
Background, 18 April 1996, TECO 1996a. 
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reduction would imply a 10% greater reduction for residential customers than an 
energy-based reduction. 
 
Table 4 shows the refunds and rate reductions in cases where the energy basis was 
involved. It calculates the residential share by reference to the residential share of 
total energy consumed, which varies from 45% to 56% depending on the utility. 
 
Table 4 Refunds to residential customers on energy rather than demand basis 
Company Year Total 
Refunds 
$m 
Residential 
refunds  
$m 
Total  
Reductions 
$m 
Residential 
reductions  
$m 
TECO 1996a 25    
“ 1996b  25    
“ 200024 13 + 6.3    
 Total 69.3  x 48% = 33   
      
GPC 1999   10 x 45% = 4.5 
      
FPL 1999 217.8 x 56% = 122 350 x 56% = 196 
 2002   250 x 56% = 140 
      
Total   $155m  $340.5m 
Possible redistribution  
(= Total x 10%) 
 $15.5m  $34.1m 
Source: Table 2 above 
.  
In total, residential customers received one-time refunds of about $155m and 
‘permanent’ rate reductions of $340m. On the basis of the 10% calculation, which is 
the latest available, residential customers in Florida would have received additional 
refunds of about $15.5m and additional rate reductions of about $34m if the 
conventional demand basis had been used instead. If rate reductions are assumed to 
last three years, the total value of the redistribution in question is about $118m. 
 
An obvious question is whether residential customers were better or worse off as a 
result of the stipulations entered into by the OPC. The above calculation suggests that 
answer depends on whether the refunds and rate reductions were more or less than 10 
per cent higher than they would otherwise have been. The analysis in the previous 
section suggests that they were much more than 10 per cent higher, not least because 
an estimated three quarters of the refunds and reductions might otherwise not have 
occurred at all. On this basis, commercial industrial customers gained particularly 
from stipulations involving the OPC, but residential customers too were better off 
despite the change in method.  
 
These calculations do not attempt to estimate whether earlier rate reductions might 
necessitate rate increases later. On the other hand, neither do they estimate the longer 
term benefits of any efficiency incentives associated with (e.g.) the fixed prices and 
use of revenue sharing. Efficiency benefits are seldom mentioned by staff or in FPSC 
                                                 
24 TECO 2000 implemented the two earlier stipulations TECO 1996a,b. It confirmed further refunds for 
1997 and 1998 at $13m and a refund for 1999 that was later agreed at $6.3m.  
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orders, although some FPSC decisions include a couple of brief references to 
acknowledge this aspect.25 Such incentives to greater efficiency could be quite 
substantial, and imply additional benefits to both investors and customers. 
 
5.3 Method of cost allocation 
 
A case that was eventually litigated (GPC 2002 docket 010949) sheds further light on 
the distribution of benefits because it involved a partial stipulation that impacted on 
this issue. The utility had requested a rate increase. Two representatives of large users 
- (Federal Executive Agencies (FEA) and Florida Industrial Power Users Group 
(FIPUG) - agreed a partial stipulation with GPC on certain cost of service and rate 
design issues (on which OPC took no position). As part of that stipulation, the two 
consumer parties agreed to withdraw from involvement in the non-stipulated issues 
concerning the level of rates. GPC argued that this would streamline remaining 
proceedings.  
 
FPSC chairman noted a concern that “The proposed settlement has the potential of 
creating an allocation methodology that puts a burden on, that could put a burden on, 
the residential consumer versus the large industrial consumer.”26 Staff argued that the 
proposed methodology would be inappropriate and inconsistent with FPSC practice, 
as well as an additional burden on residential consumers. The parties removed the 
controversial elements from the partial stipulation. FPSC accepted the stipulation, and 
separately found against these elements. 
 
In this particular case, there was a potential for a stipulation to act against the interests 
of residential customers. The stipulation was agreed by larger users and OPC took no 
position. In the event, there was no such detriment because FPSC rejected that aspect.. 
The prospect of FPSC rejection seems to have led the parties to withdraw that element 
of the stipulation. 
 
It is worth remarking that, looking at the picture as a whole, the rate reductions and 
refunds negotiated by the OPC considerably outweigh the costs of running that 
organisation. A rough calculation suggests these benefits are about two orders of 
magnitude greater than the costs.27 In addition, OPC’s arguments presumably have an 
impact in litigated cases where it does not sign a stipulation. 
                                                 
25 In the telephone case Southern Bell 1988 (docket 871401), FPSC set rates to produce a 13.2% ROE. 
Instead of the traditionally allowed range of ROE plus or minus one percent, it set a floor at 11.5%, and 
the sharing threshold at 14% “to encourage Southern Bell to become more efficient”. In TECO 1996, 
following primary staff recommendation, FPSC said “This settlement provides an incentive for TECO 
to be more cost efficient since it can retain a significant portion of any increased earnings. In recent 
years the Commission has promoted various forms of incentive regulation.” Order p. 5. 
26 GPC 2002, Prehearing conference 15 February 2002, p. 14. The stipulation calculates that 79.2% of 
the revenue increase would be allocated to residential service compared to 73.5% in the revenue 
increase approved in 1990. 
27 Looking only at the electricity sector, assume that the rate reductions of $1 bn over the last 20 years 
(see Table 2) last on average for 3 years and that about half of that reduction accrues to the residential 
sector. This makes an average reduction of about ($1bn x 3 x ½ )/20 = $75m per year. (The actual 
proportion of residential benefits may be slightly lower than one half but against this are one-off 
refunds of $140m not included here.) The annual budget of OPC is about $2.5m. Assume about two-
thirds of this budget pertains to the electricity sector, that is about $1.5m. (This is roughly the 
proportion of total stipulated rate reductions accruing from the electricity sector.) OPC’s electricity 
budget is thus of the order of 2 per cent (=1.5m/75m) of the electricity rate reductions it has negotiated 
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6. Benefits to utilities, and how rate reductions are achieved 
 
6.1 Gains from trade 
 
The utilities, OPC and other parties all agree to stipulations for essentially the same 
reason: they believe they can negotiate more from the stipulation than the full FPSC 
hearing process would deliver. We have seen that the OPC and electricity consumers 
typically get bigger and earlier rate reductions and refunds than the FPSC would 
otherwise be able or prepared to concede. Many might not have happened at all. But 
why do utilities agree to such large rate reductions and refunds when apparently the 
FPSC would not be prepared to order them? What benefit do utilities derive from 
stipulations? 28
 
There seem to be two main avenues for creating benefits to utilities. One possibility is 
that the OPC and other parties can offer concessions to the utility that are within their 
own control but beyond the remit of the FPSC. The other possibility is that the OPC 
and other parties are willing to make concessions that FPSC is able but unwilling or 
unlikely to make. In both cases, however, there is a regulatory constraint. OPC, the 
utility and the other parties can only propose a stipulation to the FPSC, they cannot 
commit the commission. The overall stipulation package therefore has to be 
acceptable to the commission as well as to the parties.  
 
6.2 Concessions outside the remit of the FPSC 
 
Just as the parties cannot commit FPSC, so too FPSC decisions cannot commit or 
bind the parties. It is therefore open to the non-utility parties either to support or to 
oppose the utility in subsequent actions, either before the FPSC or in other fora. This 
can be important to both parties. Commitments by the parties to act or not to act in a 
specified way are something that the parties can deliver that the FPSC cannot. 
 
Thus, the parties typically commit not to undermine the agreement by later action.29 
This is particularly important if the agreement covers a substantial period of time, as 
in the case of price freezes and incentive agreements. It is normally beyond the power 
of a regulatory commission to preclude a utility from making a request to increase 
rates, or a consumer group from requesting a rate review or decrease. An example is 
                                                                                                                                            
for residential customers. It was argued above that OPC stipulations have led to rate reductions much 
more than 10 per cent higher than they otherwise would have been (probably an order of magnitude 
higher). 
28 Larry Kaufmann remarks that “discussions vary on a case by case basis depending on what is most 
important to the companies and what are they willing to fight for – it’s not always the amount of the 
initial rate change, it could be a reasonable policy for stranded cost recovery, future treatment of 
pollution control obligations, getting a multi-year stay-out period etc.  Everything is often on the table 
and the process is by nature not mechanical, so it’s difficult to generalize about what drives it.” 
(personal communication 29 December 2006) 
29 E.g. in the FPC 1986 stipulation, which agreed a $54m refund for 1987, OPC undertook not to 
initiate or support any action to reduce FPC’s 1987 revenues, and FPC undertook not to initiate or 
support any action to increase its 1987 revenues. 
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the commitment in the pioneering three year incentive agreement in FPL 1999.30 
Later examples (FPL 2005 and PEF 2005) are the commitments not to appeal (and/or 
the withdrawal of existing appeals) against separate FPSC decisions on the utilities’ 
recovery of storm damage costs. 
 
Parties sometimes agree to withdraw opposition in another forum. For example, in 
FPC 1997b an intervening Senator agreed to withdraw his complaints in the Supreme 
Court.31 In FPL 1999 the utility agreed to cap accruals for nuclear decommissioning 
and fossil dismantlement at previously authorised levels, and FIPUG and CER agreed 
to withdraw their protests on this issue. In TECO 2000 the settlement agreed to a 
refund of $13m “as soon as practicable after [the relevant FPSC orders] are made final 
and non-appealable”, and also provided that “FIPUG and OPC will file a joint 
Dismissal of the Appeal in FIPUG v FPSC” at the Florida Supreme Court which had 
previously challenged these orders. 
 
6.3 An example from the telephone sector 
 
An earlier example from the telephone rather than electricity sector further illustrates 
this point. In June 1992 Centel filed to request a permanent rate increase of $17.9m 
with an interim increase of $9.1m. In September 1992 FPSC approved an interim 
increase of $4.6m, effective immediately. Meanwhile, Centel had announced a merger 
with Sprint (the owner of United Telephone Company of Florida). OPC filed motions 
to dismiss or delay the rate hearing. During the final hearing on the docket in 
December 1992, the parties reached a stipulated settlement. Centel agreed to reduce 
its rates and make a refund for the forthcoming 18 months for its earnings in excess of 
12.0% ROE, maintaining its recently-authorised ROE for other purposes at 12.5%. 
This stipulation corresponded to a permanent rate increase of $3.5m rather than the 
interim $4.6m. Since the agreed rate increase was $1.1m less than the approved 
interim rate increase, OPC and the parties could (and did) announce it as a rate 
reduction. 
 
This was obviously attractive to OPC, but why would Centel agree to accept $1.1m 
less revenue than the Commission had already approved? Part of the explanation is 
that the revenue reduction would have less adverse impact on the merged company 
than on Centel alone. But additional features of the stipulation were that it was 
contingent on the approval of the merger by Centel shareowners, that the 
Commission’s approval of the stipulation eliminated the need for the Commission to 
resolve any issues raised in the docket except those in the stipulation, and that the 
parties undertook to support the acceptance of the stipulation by the Commission. The 
net effect of these conditions was presumably to withdraw any substantive or 
procedural objection to the merger by OPC and, if accepted, by FPSC as well. The 
company evidently judged that this was worth $1.1m.  
                                                 
30 “OPC, FIPUG and the Coalition [for Equitable Rates, or CER] will neither seek nor support any 
additional reduction in FPL’s base rates and charges … for three years. … FPL will not petition for an 
increase in its base rates and charges … [for] three years.” Similar provisions apply in FPL 2005 and 
PEF 2005. 
31 “Dismissal of impending litigation. This section provides that upon approval of the Stipulation, 
Senator Charlie Crist shall promptly take all appropriate steps and file all appropriate pleadings  to 
effectuate a dismissal of his complaints pending before the Sixth Judicial Circuit and the Supreme 
Court of Florida.” FPC 1997, p. 7. 
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7. Accounting policy 
 
Independently of the stipulations, FPSC’s thinking and practice on accounting policy 
was evolving, including in the direction of greater flexibility. During the 1990s, 
particularly from about 1993, FPSC policy was to apply excess earnings to faster 
depreciation of regulatory assets in order to avoid potentially stranded costs in the 
event of deregulation and competition. This was attractive to the utilities too: it 
reduced the risk of stranding, and put them in a stronger financial position if 
deregulation did not occur. FPSC recognised that the discretion to apply excess 
earnings in this way, rather than in the form of refunds or rate reductions, could 
therefore be an incentive to efficiency on the part of the utility.  
 
Not surprisingly, perhaps, this was not OPC’s preferred use of excess earnings. But it 
had to offer at least comparable flexibility and incentives to the utilities in order to 
secure their agreement. Over the years, stipulations have often prescribed accounting 
policy for the utilities, notably with respect to depreciation and reserves, which in 
many cases have been less onerous, or allowed greater flexibility to the utility, than 
FPSC’s rather conservative policy. This has often facilitated refunds, rate freezes or 
reductions that would otherwise not have been possible.  
 
Appendix 4 sets out the provisions of the stipulations with respect to these accounting 
policy issues. This section summarises the main features and notes the views 
expressed by staff and others, which are often a useful guide to where the stipulations 
departed from established policy.  
 
7.1 The main cases 
 
FPC 1986 specified that the $54m refund was dependent, inter alia, on deferring the 
FPSC’s represcription of FPC’s depreciation rates that might otherwise have 
necessitated a rate increase. This does not seem to have caused a problem with staff, 
perhaps since FPSC had not yet taken a final view on the nature of the represcription. 
 
GPC 1993 provided that the utility would use an alternative straight-line method 
instead of FPSC’s recently determined dismantlement policy. This would defer the 
amount of the dismantlement accrual. Primary staff recommended against this 
because of inter-generational inequities and because it precluded proper debate of a 
generic issue. Alternative staff noted the benefits of avoiding the present rate increase 
and of lower future rates. Picking up the Commission’s phrase in an earlier 
stipulation, they advised “Although adoption of the stipulation will defer 
implementation of the dismantlement accrual increase found appropriate by the 
Commission in Order No. 24741, we believe that a bird in the hand is worth two in 
the bush.”  
 
FPSC had approved TECO’s proposals to use a reduction in its authorised ROE to 
build up its storm damage accrual. In contrast, TECO 1996a applied the overearnings 
to a refund. Alternative staff was concerned that “other opportunities to reduce 
regulatory assets, mitigate potential ‘stranded costs’, or handle other regulatory 
balance sheet concerns will be foregone”. 
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FPC 1997b facilitated a four year rate freeze by suspending accruals to the fossil 
dismantlement reserve for four years. It also provided discretion to amortize 
regulatory assets. 
 
During the mid-1990s FPSC had approved FPL plans for writing off nearly $1 bn of 
regulatory assets, and in 1998 approved a continuation of this. OPC objected that “the 
time has now come for the customers to share in the benefits.” As a means of 
facilitating a $350m reduction in base rates, FPL 1999 capped accruals for nuclear 
decommissioning and fossil dismantlement at previous authorised levels. It also 
authorized FPL to record amortization up to $100m per year to reduce nuclear and/or 
fossil plant in service, in addition to normal depreciation. This latter discretion was 
presumably attractive to the utility, but anathema to staff. Accelerated depreciation 
was “not the writing off of a perceived historical deficit”, which would have been 
acceptable. Instead, it would mean that depreciation, and the resultant rate base, 
would reflect the variability of the company’s revenues. This was a violation of the 
“matching principle”, of matching capital recovery with consumption over an asset’s 
service life.  
 
In response to concerns about earnings and ROE, GPC proposed an earnings sharing 
incentive plan that, inter alia, devoted 20% of excess earnings to writing off certain 
regulatory assets and increasing a reserve. FPSC approved an alternative plan 
proposed by staff, which involved a higher proportion to writing off assets. GPC 
1999 provided for an immediate rate reduction for customers. GPC was given 
discretion, rather than a requirement, to write off the regulatory assets and increase 
the reserve. This did not attract adverse comment from staff. 
 
Two contemporaneous stipulations, FPL 2002 and FPC 2002 embodied significant 
rate reductions of $250m and $125m, respectively. In both cases, half of this was 
effectively funded by annual reductions in depreciation of $125m and $62.5m, 
respectively.32 FPL had discretion to reduce depreciation up to that amount; FPC had 
discretion to reverse all or part of the $62.5m reduction, and discretion to accelerate 
amortization of certain regulatory assets, and accruals for nuclear decommissioning 
and fossil dismantlement were suspended. Instead of increasing the annual accrual for 
storm damage reserve, FPL agreed to petition for recovery of storm costs in the event 
there were insufficient funds in the reserve. Perhaps in view of FPSC’s approval of 
the previous stipulation (FPL 1999), staff this time expressed no concern about the 
discretionary element of depreciation. 
 
Three years later, the new challenge was to address requested rate increases of $430m 
and $206m respectively, particularly given that the Attorney General’s Office had 
indicated a strong preference for no rate increases. The stipulations achieved this by 
suspending storm damage accruals and meeting future storm costs by surcharge or 
securitisation; suspending nuclear decommissioning and fossil dismantlement 
accruals; continuing the ability to reduce depreciation and to accelerate amortization; 
and providing for certain future costs to be recovered as prudently incurred instead of 
by base rate increases. There was no adverse comment from staff. 
 
                                                 
32 In the accounts, this was achieved by recording the normal approved level of depreciation, then 
recording a negative depreciation expense that effectively reduced the normal level of depreciation, 
though not to the point of effectively writing up rather than writing down the value of assets. 
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7.2 Conclusions on accounting policy 
 
Over time, stipulations seem to have terminated then reversed the conservative 
accounting policy that FPSC had adopted in the early 1990s. FPSC encouraged the 
utilities to use excess earnings to write off regulatory assets and to increase reserves. 
It gave the utilities discretion in doing so as an incentive to efficiency. In contrast, 
OPC and other signatories took the view that adequate provision had now been made 
for writing off regulatory assets and increasing reserves: consumers preferred jam 
today in the form of refunds and rate reductions, rather than lower prices tomorrow. 
And if additional costs needed to be incurred in future (e.g. for storm damage) they 
could be funded at the time or thereafter.  
 
The stipulations further moved away from FPSC’s conservative policy by capping 
accruals and reducing depreciation. They still gave companies the incentive of 
flexibility, indeed they extended that flexibility to include reduced or accelerated 
depreciation of economic assets. Staff at first objected to those stipulations that went 
beyond conventional treatment of economic assets, but later accepted this. It had 
become apparent that FPSC was willing to accept a more flexible policy if that 
secured the significant refunds and rate reductions that customers appeared to want: 
the FPSC, too, came to prefer the bird in hand. 
 
8. From rate of return regulation to revenue sharing incentive plans 
 
Under traditional rate of return regulation, the regulatory commission determines fair 
and reasonable rates based on an examination of operating costs and capital 
investments. A central role is played by the determination of an appropriate rate of 
return on the approved rate base. This rate of return comprises an allowed return on 
equity (ROE) plus an assumed equity ratio (the ratio of common equity to total 
borrowings including debt plus equity). Traditionally, commissions would call 
utilities for review, or utilities would petition for a rate increase, as and when their 
achieved returns exceeded or fell below a range around the last allowed ROE (or 
seemed likely to do so). The range was typically plus or minus 1 %.  In this ‘building 
block’ model, the determination of allowed rate base and allowed ROE are necessary 
inputs for determining allowed rates for the utility. 
 
In principle this approach still applies in Florida, athough FPSC has modified it to 
include incentive elements based on discretionary write-downs of regulatory assets 
and earnings sharing. For example, it was last applied in the electricity sector in GPC 
2002 (docket 010949), where the utility requested a rate increase.33  
 
In practice the traditional approach has largely been superceded in the Florida 
electricity sector by the different approach embodied in stipulated agreements 
between the utilities and interested parties including OPC. In addition to the more 
extensive use of discretionary writedowns, as noted in the previous section, there 
seem to be two main aspects to the change of approach. First, there is a downplaying 
of ROE and other inputs to the regulatory decision and a correspondingly increased 
focus on rates and other outputs of the regulatory decision. This leads on to the use of 
                                                 
33 A part of this Order, FPSC rejected the incentive plan proposed by GPC and invited the utility to 
propose another earnings sharing plan. GPC attempted to negotiate a settlement along these lines but 
was unable to reach agreement, and declined the invitation. 
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refunds and multi-period rate freezes. The change in focus from inputs to outputs is 
also noticeable with respect to the determination of the rate base, as exemplified by 
the treatment of new investment. Second, there has been a development of revenue-
sharing instead of earnings-sharing incentive plans. 
 
8.1 Downplaying ROE 
 
FPC 1986 was agreed in a context of expected reductions in federal income tax and 
ROE. However, contrary to normal regulatory practice it did not agree revised levels 
of these inputs and calculate whether a refund was appropriate, nor did it defer the 
issue in order to calculate an appropriate rate for the longer term. Instead, it noted that 
the relevant magnitudes were uncertain and nonetheless proceeded to specify a one-
time refund to customers. 
 
In determining a permanent rate for the next year onwards, FPC 1987 first declare the 
agreed annual rate reduction of $121.5m in 1988. It then commented that “The data 
used during the negotiating process would indicate that an equity return of 12.6% 
would be produced.” To the extent that FPC’s earned ROE did not exceed 13.6% FPC 
was entitled to a corresponding increase in its base rates in 1989. And for the purpose 
of determining whether to institute proceedings for interim rate increases or decreases, 
“the parties and FPC agree that the Commission shall utilize” an ROE of 12.6% and 
13.6% respectively. Perhaps the form of wording is chosen to avoid either party 
having to commit to a particular value that it might wish to argue against if litigation 
proved necessary. But in appearance, at least, ROE has already become an output or 
decision variable rather than an input. ROE figures now have a functional role as 
contract reopeners, rather than as the basis of the price determination.  
 
FPSC made some approving remarks about stipulations (see earlier). “In addition” to 
this, it was worth noting that the revenue reduction was the highest in the history of 
the state and within 4% of Staff’s initial position. FPSC did not seek to assess or 
demonstrate further – for example, by carrying out its own calculations – whether the 
stipulated values were reasonable. 
 
GPC had requested a rate increase associated with FPSC’s new dismantlement 
accruals policy. GPC 1993 provided that GPC would use an alternative straight-line 
method of calculation, and “that in exchange for the foregoing relief the Company 
agrees to accept 12.00% as the midpoint of a range of 11.0% - 13.0% for its 
authorized rate of return on common equity”. Together, these provisions would avoid 
the need for an increase in rates. Allowed ROE is thus chosen to avoid a price 
increase, rather than estimated as the basis for deciding whether a price increase is 
justified or not.  
 
8.2 Refunds and rate freezes 
 
Over the period 1993 to 1995 FPSC reviewed and promulgated a series of proposals 
for revising TECO’s ROE and deferring a proportion of earnings from one year to the 
next. In contrast, TECO 1996a provided for an immediate refund plus a three year 
rate freeze for 1996 to 1998. It also agreed to defer proportions of net revenues 
outside specified ROE bands. Alternative staff objected that many of the ROE and 
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other provisions were not justified.34 FPSC accepted the stipulation, essentially 
repeating the benefits of the stipulation noted by primary staff35 with no further 
reference to the concerns of alternative staff. 
 
Staff evidently responded to this decision. TECO 1996b made an additional refund 
and extended the existing rate freeze and other provisions for a further year (1999). 
Staff raised no significant objection.36
 
While the parties may well have made assumptions about ROE in negotiating these 
agreements, there is no claim in the stipulations themselves that they embody accurate 
forecasts of cost of capital or that the prescribed rates follow from ROE assumptions. 
Rather, the rate refunds and freezes are paramount, while the ROE figures are a 
convenient basis for sharing earnings over a multi-year period. 
 
8.3 Prudent investment: two TECO cases 
 
Allowed ROE is traditionally applied to an authorised rate base. The Commission 
satisfies itself that a new utility investment is prudent, and that it is used and useful. 
Two pairs of stipulations in particular effectively took over this role from the 
Commission. 
 
A new IGCC unit was being added at TECO’s Polk Power station, the background to 
which was somewhat unusual.37 TECO 1996a provided for this investment to be 
considered separately, with the parties to negotiate a joint recommendation thereto for 
Commission approval. Primary staff listed a series of benefits of the stipulation that 
led them to recommend acceptance, but nonetheless had a “major concern” about the 
ratemaking treatment of Polk.38 Alternative staff shared the concern, arguing that “at 
                                                 
34 It also agreed to defer 60% of 1996 net revenues contributing to ROE over 11.75% and 60% of 1997 
and 1998 net revenues over 11.75% and all 1997 net revenues over 12.75%, and to refund to customers 
all 1998 net revenues over 12.75%. Alternative staff objected that: based on current market conditions 
the ROE midpoint should be reduced from 11.75% to the range 9.75% to 11.25%; there was no 
mechanism to ensure that future sharing points are reasonable (they should be indexed to movements in 
a readily available, widely traded interest rate); there was no ROE cap for 1996, which would set a 
precedent; and there was doubt about the accuracy of TECO’s projected returns. 
35 Primary staff argued as follows: that ratepayers were protected for the most part by the rate freeze; 
that although the capped 1997 and 1998 returns were high it was unlikely that TECO would reach 
them; that the refund and deferral of revenues would reduce the possibility of over-earnings in 1996; 
and that the settlement would provide an incentive for TECO to be more cost efficient since it could 
retain a significant portion of any increased earnings.  
36 The stipulation gave TECO permission to defer 1998 revenues into 1999, and required a refund in 
2000 of 60% of 1999 earnings on ROE in the range 12% to 12.75% and of all 1999 earnings beyond 
that. Staff commented only that the proposed starting point for 1999 sharing was now 12% instead of 
11.75%, so that TECO could retain more earnings before it started to share. 
37 In 1992 the Commission had approved TECO’s petition to build a 220MW Integrated Gasified 
Combined Cycle (IGCC) unit, fueled by gasified coal, in Polk County, Florida. A docket was opened to 
review the prudence of this unit, and the appropriate regulatory treatment. Approval was contingent on 
TECO securing a $120m grant from the US Department of Energy to defray construction and operating 
costs, which it did. The Commission order said that the unit was projected to have an installed cost of 
$389m including DOE funding. In 1996, TECO projected the cost of the plant, scheduled to be placed 
in service in October 1996, to be approximately $506m net of the DOE grant. 
38 If the Commission disallowed some of the related costs as imprudent, the settlement might prevent 
an otherwise justified rate reduction and/or refund. “It would be preferable for the parties to agree that 
the settlement could be modified to the limited extent action is taken for the Polk Power Plant. 
…Primary Staff recommends isolating the 1997 and 1998 ROE impacts of any disallowance of Polk 
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a minimum, the Commission should defer voting on the stipulation until the 
regulatory treatment of the Polk Power Station is determined”. They noted that the 
regulatory treatment of Polk was a major controversial issue yet outstanding, and 
could necessitate a decrease in base rates. FPSC nonetheless approved the stipulation 
with no reference to the concerns about Polk. 
 
Six months later, TECO 1996b provided a further refund and extension of the rate 
freeze. It included a finding of prudence on the commencement and continued 
construction of the Polk IGCC unit, and provided for inclusion of the actual final 
capital cost in the rate base and of its full operating expense in net operating income.  
 
This time, staff views were consolidated into a single recommendation in favour of 
the stipulation “overall”. However, there was an extensive discussion of advantages 
and disadvantages. The main advantages to customers were the additional one-year 
extension of the rate freeze, which was important in the context of Polk,39 and the 
guaranteed additional $25m refund. The disadvantages included the conferral of a 
determination of prudence and hence authorised full cost recovery for the continued 
construction of the Polk Unit. Staff questioned the prudence of this investment in lieu 
of a natural gas fired combined cycle alternative.40  
 
Whether and to what extent this investment could or would have been proved 
imprudent in a full hearing was and is uncertain. Staff were evidently concerned at not 
being able to assess the prudence of the investment in the traditional way. It was 
presumably advantageous to both TECO and OPC to reserve the initial treatment of 
Polk station to themselves, especially given the strong and unanimous staff concern 
about this issue, rather than to incur the uncertainty and other costs of a hearing. 
TECO was presumably relieved to get its investment into the rate base, while OPC 
took the view that the additional year of rate freeze provided better practical 
protection for customers than the conventional regulatory approach. 
 
8.4 Prudent investment: two FPC cases 
 
Another pair of stipulations involved FPC. The utility had requested approval to buy-
out Tiger Bay cogeneration plant and associated fuel contracts, an expensive legacy of 
the Qualifying Facility era. The rationality of this does not seem to have been 
questioned, but OPC was concerned that it could lead to rate increases before the cost 
reductions took effect. FPC 1997a gave additional certainty to customers by varying 
                                                                                                                                            
Power Plant costs and deferring it until 1999 when the disposition of the potential increased earnings 
can be determined.” Alternative cost recovery mechanisms “may be appropriate in light of the Polk 
units’ apparent high overall cost of generating electricity and increasing electric utility competition”. 
39 Additional rate stability was particularly important during the initial years of operation of the Polk 
IGCC unit, which involved the testing of experimental technology on a variety of different coal-based 
feedstocks. Also, TECO was experiencing increasing pressure from large-use customers that were 
threatening to find other power supply alternatives. The stipulation provided that, if TECO were to 
respond by seeking authority to negotiate discount rates with these customers, rates to the remaining 
customers would not increase during the period of the stipulation.  
40 There was also concern about another provision. The stipulation recognised that the Port Manatee 
site was not currently used nor planned to be used, so it placed the current book cost of the site below 
the line for regulatory purposes. The stipulation also provided that the company would get 100% of any 
subsequent gain or loss on the sale of the site, although ratepayers would be no worse off if the site 
were subsequently reaquired by TECO for utility purposes. Staff supported the exclusion of the 
investment in the Port Manatee site, but not its subsequent ratemaking treatment 
 26
the conventional regulatory accounting treatment so that the additional costs should 
not flow through to customers faster than the benefits.  
 
At the same time, FPC was also applying to recover replacement fuel costs associated 
with an outage at its Crystal River 3 nuclear plant. OPC challenged the amounts 
claimed, arguing inter alia that FPC bore some responsibility for the outage. FPC 
1997b confirmed that FPC’s costs would be recovered, but on a deferred basis and 
with an immediate refund of the additional charges levied to date. There was a four 
year freeze on base rates, and a four-year suspension of accruals to reserve. Again, the 
conventional accounting and regulatory provisions (such as whether expenses would 
go into base rates or fuel adjustment and other clauses) were varied to enable the 
desired outcome.  
 
These four stipulations do not start from, or explicitly describe, an analysis of the 
justification for the investments involved, and proceed to calculate the implications 
for rates. This does not necessarily mean that OPC and FPSC did not carry out such 
analyses. However, having presumably satisfied themselves as to how much of the 
investment it is reasonable to recover, the direction of causation is the opposite: the 
aim is the freezing of rates over a foreseeable period ahead, and the accounting and 
regulatory treatments are adjusted to secure that end. 
 
8.4 Revenue sharing incentive plans 
 
Reference has been made to earnings sharing arrangements introduced by FPSC and 
OPC. Monitoring and enforcement of these schemes was not without difficulty. In the 
telephone sector there had been problems in agreeing the levels of earnings each year 
under the Southern Bell 1994 sharing scheme. In electricity, the calculation of 
TECO’s earnings led to a series of potentially debatable determinations.41 FIPUG and 
OPC protested FPSC decisions on TECO’s 1997 and 1998 earnings, before agreeing 
refunds in the TECO 2000 stipulation. FPSC’s decision on 1999 earnings was also 
protested. 
 
The concern was that companies were reducing their earnings by artificially 
increasing their costs, particularly by additional or inappropriate expenditure. OPC 
wanted a more objective scheme, less subject to manipulation of costs, one that was 
quicker and easier to implement. It saw revenue-sharing rather than earnings-sharing 
as the answer.  
 
FPL 1999 provided for sharing of revenues within specified ranges. The range was 
$3.4bn to $3.556bn in the first year rising to $3.56bn to $3.656bn in the third year. 
Within this range, one third of revenues would go to FPL and two thirds to customers; 
revenues above the tops of those ranges would be refunded wholly to customers. The 
                                                 
41 E.g. “TECO’s 1997 Earnings Surveillance Report was the subject of an audit by Commission staff.  
The audit report discusses certain transactions and practices which could potentially change the amount 
of TECO’s 1997 earnings.  Specifically, the issues in this Order discuss asset transfers between 
affiliates, the Company’s equity ratio, TECO’s investment in a 25% interest in a transmission line, 
industry association dues, advertising, allocation to subsidiaries and the Energy Technology Resource 
Center.  Each of these issues not only affects earnings for 1997, but also has an impact for 1998 and 
beyond.” In re: Determination of regulated earnings of Tampa Electric Company pursuant to 
stipulations for calendar years 1995 through 1999. Docket No. 950379-EI Order No. PSC-99-1940-
PAA-EI Issued: October 1, 1999. 
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stipulation specified FPL’s authorised ROE range as 10% to 12% with an 11% 
midpoint “for all regulatory purposes”. However, the stipulation was quite explicit 
that rate of return regulation was to be superceded by the revenue sharing mechanism. 
 
“… it being understood that during the term of this Stipulation and Settlement the achieved 
return on equity may, from time to time, be outside the authorized range and the sharing 
mechanism herein described is intended to be the appropriate and exclusive mechanism to 
address that circumstance.  …[and] it being expressly understood and agreed that the 
mechanism for earnings sharing established herein is not intended to be a vehicle for “rate 
case” type enquiry concerning expenses, investment and financial results of operations.” 
 
There is no indication that FPSC staff shared OPC’s concern about using earnings as 
the basis of an incentive scheme. Rather, staff were worried about the radical 
implications for regulation. Primary staff expressed concern about the achieved ROE 
being outside the authorised range, about the sharing mechanism being the exclusive 
mechanism to address that circumstance, about the mechanism for earnings sharing 
not intended to be a vehicle for ‘rate case’ type enquiry, and indeed about the whole 
concept of revenue sharing.42 To ameliorate this last concern, there is a repeated 
affirmation that the Stipulation should not and cannot fetter the discretion of the 
Commission.43 Alternative staff estimated that FPL would earn over the top of the 
ROE range and that earnings would continue to grow, and noted with concern the 
absence of a cap on earnings: “This provision of the Stipulation makes ROE basically 
meaningless for surveillance purposes.” 
 
FPSC showed no concern on these regulatory issues. It noted the benefits of the 
stipulation and approved FPL 1999 without qualification. 44  
 
Meanwhile GPC had proposed a regulatory incentive plan on 2 March 1999. On 20 
April 1999 FPSC rejected this proposal and approved a similar plan designed by staff. 
                                                 
42 “This Stipulation will cause the Commission to alter its traditional viewpoint concerning ROE and 
excess earnings…. FPL could earn above the top of its authorised range for ROE, 12% if its revenues 
are below $3.4 billion. Therefore, this Stipulation requires the Commission to make a fundamental 
change in its traditional rate base and rate of return regulation. The Stipulation is essentially based on 
revenues, not earnings. / The Commission has approved sharing plans before. In Docket No. 880069-
TL, the Commission approved a rate stabilisation plan for Southern Bell. This plan had a sharing 
mechanism in which revenues were shared between customers and shareholders from the point at 
which earnings exceeded the top of the range for ROE. The proposed Stipulation presented by FPL, 
OPC et al could allow earnings to exceed the authorized ROE and be retained entirely by 
shareholders.” 
43 The wording of a previous order is recalled. “The Commission, even if it so desired, cannot be bound 
to a specific course of action through the approval of a stipulation. … we may not bind the Commission 
to take or forego action in derogation of our statutory obligations.” This leads on to a conclusion that 
may be somewhat more reassuring to staff and FPSC than to the utility. “The Stipulation binds the 
parties, and not the Commission. The Commission remains able to utilise during the term of the 
agreement, all powers explicitly and impliedly granted by Chapter 366, Florida Statutes. This includes 
the ability to determine that the rates charged by FPL are no longer fair, just and reasonable, and to 
change those rates. This also includes the ability to order an interim change in rates. Given that this 
stipulation does not limit the Commission’s ability to exercise its jurisdiction to the fullest extent, and 
does not violate any specific provision of Chapter 366, it is consistent with the requirements of Chapter 
366.” 
44 “Among other things, this Stipulation provides for a $350m annual rate reduction. It provides 
immediate and substantial benefits for customer of FPL. Therefore we find that the Stipulation should 
be approved.” 
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Both plans prescribed earnings levels and sharing of earnings.45 In contrast, GPC 
1999 filed on October 1 1999 embodied an immediate rate reduction and a three year 
revenue-sharing plan along the lines of FPL 1999. Staff noted that “this Stipulation 
requires a fundamental change in its traditional rate base and rate of return 
regulation”, but that the stipulation binds the parties not the Commission. Staff 
recommended approval and FPSC agreed. 
 
FPL 2002 that succeeded FPL 1999 was more explicitly aimed at incentives to 
efficiency.46 What is now called a Revenue Sharing Incentive Plan to the end of 2005 
involves base revenue thresholds and caps rising from ($3580m - $3740m) in 2002 to 
($3880m - $4040m) in 2005. As before, revenues within these ranges go 1/3 to 
shareholders and 2/3 to customers, with all revenue over the cap going to customers. 
There is a similar affirmation of the non-role of ROE regulation. In fact, “FPL will no 
longer have an authorized ROE range for the purpose of addressing earnings levels”, 
although if FPL’s earnings fall below 10% ROE it may petition FPSC to amend its 
base rates. FPSC found that the stipulation “appears to be a reasonable resolution of 
the issues”.47 FPC 2002 embodied the same provisions for a Revenue Sharing 
Incentive Plan.48
 
FPL 2005 and PEF 2005 succeeding the 2002 stipulations define new four-year 
Revenue Sharing Incentive Plans, refined in the light of experience to reduce 
forecasting risk. This time the thresholds and caps are defined in terms of the previous 
year’s outturn values increased by the average annual growth rate in kWh sales for the 
previous ten year period. As before, the companies would operate without authorized 
ROE levels for the purpose of addressing earnings levels, with the revenue sharing 
mechanism the appropriate and exclusive mechanism to address earnings levels, but 
an ROE of 11.75% would be used for all other regulatory purposes. The option to 
petition FPSC if ROE fell below 10% remained. 
 
PEF 2005 gave the company the option of continuing the plan for another six months 
into 2010. FLE 2005 introduced an ‘evergreen’ clause.49 FPSC seems to have 
accepted these and the other regulatory changes with equanimity.50
                                                 
45 The main differences between the two proposals were the ROE at which earnings are targeted, the 
ROE at which sharing would begin, the sharing percentages, a productivity factor for 2000 and the 
treatment of non utility investments. Order May 24 1999. 
46 The preamble to FPL 1999 had remarked that “a rate base proceeding can be costly, time consuming, 
lengthy and disruptive to efficient and appropriate management and regulatory effort.” The preamble to 
FPL 2002 observes that the parties have aimed “to provide incentives to FPL to continue to promote 
efficiency through the term of this Stipulation”. 
47 It clarified that “FPL will still have a currently authorized ROE range of 10.00% to 12.00%, with an 
11.00% midpoint, for all other purposes, such as cost recovery clauses and Allowance for Funds Used 
during Construction.” 
48 In FPC’s case the currently authorized FOE range was 11 – 13% with 12% midpoint. 
49 It would continue for its Minimum Term until 31 December 2009, “and thereafter shall remain in 
effect until terminated on the date that new base rates become effective pursuant to order of the FPSC 
following a formal administrative hearing held either on the FPSC’s own motion or on request made by 
any of the Parties”. 
50 In approving both stipulations, FPSC commented “As with any settlement we approve, nothing in 
our approval of this Stipulation and Settlement diminishes this Commission’s ongoing authority and 
obligation to ensure fair, just, and reasonable rates. Nonetheless, this Commission has a long history of 
encouraging settlements, giving great weight and deference to settlements, and enforcing them in the 
spirit in which they were reached by the parties.” 
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9. Rate structure and quality of service 
 
9.1 Further effects of stipulations on rate structure 
 
As the representative of citizens in utility matters, OPC has been primarily interested 
in refunds, rate freezes and rate reductions wherever possible. It typically takes no 
position on the distributional aspects.51 Other intervenors have a particular concern 
for the type of customer they represent, hence have an interest in rate structure as well 
as the general rate level.  
 
The main intervenor and co-signer of electricity stipulations has been the Florida 
Industrial Power Users Group (FIPUG). Its interest is in keeping electricity prices to 
large users as low as possible, consistent with maintaining quality and continuity of 
supply. The use of energy-based reductions in certain stipulations favoured large 
industrial users. This presumably reflects the influence of FIPUG, as discussed above.  
 
A number of other intervenors have signed stipulations. Presumably they would not 
continue to do so unless they generally secured a more favourable outcome than 
would otherwise eventuate. What sorts of aims do these other intervenor groups have, 
and what kinds of detail do they seek to embody in the stipulations?  
 
Exhibit A in FPC 2002 dealt specifically with some rate structure issues. Some 
provisions maintain existing rate structures that would otherwise disappear, others 
introduce new rate structures. It is possible that the latter would not have been 
introduced otherwise, but it is also possible that the parties are content to use the 
stipulations to implement provisions that would otherwise have been introduced via 
the normal hearings process.  
 
9.2 Maintaining existing rate schedules  
 
FPC was proposing to close certain uneconomic rate schedules.52 FPSC would 
normally transition off uneconomic schedules, and indeed these might have 
disappeared earlier had previous stipulations not precluded rate reviews. The 
stipulation provided that the schedules should remain in effect for existing users.53 
This ensured the continuation of these schedules for at least the term of the settlement, 
over three and a half years. The beneficiaries of this would have been existing large 
users, no doubt members of FIPUG.  
 
                                                 
51 In FPC 2002 discussed below, OPC and the Florida Retail Association explicitly noted that they had 
taken no position on these particular issues, and “neither support nor oppose the cost of service and rate 
design provisions set forth in this exhibit”. 
52 “In its MFR filing FPC had proposed to close the rates and require the existing customers to transfer 
to the IS-2, IST-2, CS-2 and CST-2 non-firm rates because the company did not believe that the current 
IS-1, IST-1, CS-1 and CST-1 credits were cost effective.” Order on the Stipulation. 
53 “The billing demand credits for Interruptible and Curtailable customers currently receiving service 
under FPC’s IS-1, IST-1, CS-1 and CST-1 rate schedules shall remain in effect for the term of this 
Stipulation and Settlement, and thereafter until these rates schedules are reviewed in a general rate 
case, provided however, that these rate schedules shall continue to be closed to new customers….” 
Stipulation para 15. 
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Another example (Exhibit A, para 3) provides that “customers will be billed for a 
minimum of 500 kw of demand, even if their actual measured demand falls below that 
level for the month”. However, this will not apply to existing customers if they give 
36 months notice. FPC indicated that there are three existing customers who will be 
affected by the new requirement. Presumably these are FIPUG members, who gain 
three years grace. 
 
9.3 Introducing new rate schedules  
 
Sometimes stipulations are used to achieve the same ends as the litigated approach. 
For example, the Stipulation provides (Para16 and Exhibit A para 1) that the current 
flat-rate energy charge shall be redesigned using an inverted rate design. The first 
1000Wh per month is to be billed at a lower rate than the next 1000 kWh. My 
understanding is that such a rate had earlier been adopted by FPL, and had been 
proposed by FPC. Staff had no objection, and it had some basis in energy 
conservation as well as assisting lower income customers. 54 It is not clear whether 
any signatories of the stipulation would themselves benefit from this provision. (The 
average consumption of members of the Sugarmill Woods Civic Association might be 
under the breakeven level.) 
 
Another example (Exhibit A, para 2) provides for an increase in the billing demand 
credits for certain interruptible rates, to compensate non-firm customers for 
interruptions. According to Staff, “The revised credits represent the cost-effective 
level proposed by FPC in its MFR filing.” The purpose of the clause is presumably to 
secure the level of credit that would have resulted from the litigated process rather 
than to lose this as a result of the stipulation replacing that process. The beneficiaries 
of higher credits for non-firm customers would be FIPUG members. 
 
Other paragraphs of Exhibit A propose to adopt increases in certain other service 
charges and lighting charges as earlier proposed by FPC, to the extent of $11m and 
$3m respectively. This is presumably a cost-reflective move that is in the interests of 
FPC and customers generally. There is a provision that maintenance charges 
(typically for existing lighting fixtures) will remain unchanged, which might benefit 
such signatory customers as Publix supermarket. Yet other provisions may be a 
convenient means of recording items that the company and FPSC have agreed upon. 
They are not always a means of giving preferential treatment that would not otherwise 
be allowed.55
 
9.4 Quality of supply 
 
FPC 2002 included a specific and novel quality of service provision that provided for 
compensation payments (a refund of $3m a year in 2004 and 2005) to customers 
served by the worst performing lines if FPC did not achieve a 20% improvement in a 
standard interruptions index. 
 
                                                 
54 The Order points out that “Under the inverted rate, customers who use less than 1500 kwh per month 
will see a reduction in their bill relative to the levelized rate, while those who use above that level will 
see an increase.” (p. 7) 
55 E.g. “Employee dental expenses are considered to be a prudently incurred expense and will be 
treated as such, including for surveillance reporting, as of the Implementation Date.” FPL 1999 
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FPC will continue the implementation of its four-year Commitment to Excellence Reliability 
Plan, including its objective of a 20% improvement in FPC’s System Average Interruption 
Duration Index (SAIDI), measured on a calendar-year basis, by no later than 2004. FPC will 
provide a $3million refund to customers in the event that this SAIDI improvement is not 
achieved for calendar years 2004 and 2005. Any such refunds will be paid in equal amounts to 
the 10% of FPC’s total retail customers served by FPC’s worst performing distribution feeder 
lines based on each feeder line’s SAIDI performance. SAIDI levels will be calculated 
consistent with the Commission’s reliability reporting procedures, but SAIDI performance 
levels during 2004 and 2005 will be adjusted for extraordinary weather conditions that may 
occur during those years. Any disputes concerning the existence or extent of extraordinary 
weather conditions will be resolved by the Commission. 
 
Given the concern at the time about FPC’s service, it seems likely that some measures 
would have been taken even in the absence of the stipulation. Whether the same 
measures would have been taken is debateable. The approach adopted here, involving 
payments, mirrors that adopted earlier in a 1994 stipulation between OPC and 
Southern Bell. FPC 2002 seems to be the first use of this approach in the Florida 
electricity sector. A customer refund was then a novel approach, and had obvious 
advantages over a penalty payment. Focusing it on the worst-served areas had 
intuitive appeal. Capping the level would give assurance to the company that the 
adverse consequence of failing to meet the target would be manageable. Allowing the 
company to adjust for extraordinary weather conditions (subject to appeal to the 
Commission) gave additional assurance and workability.  
 
It is not clear that the Commission would have the power to order any or most of 
these provisions, either ex ante or ex post. FPSC cited the possible refund as one of 
the benefits that led it to approve stipulation FPC 2002.56  
 
10. Conclusions  
 
10.1 Summary of findings 
 
The main findings of this paper are as follows. 
 
- Stipulated settlements in the electricity sector (and other sectors) in Florida 
have primarily been driven by the Office of Public Counsel (the consumer 
advocate), but supported by other intervenor groups.  
- The complexity of issues and the varying number of intervenors did not make 
it difficult to reach agreements to sign stipulations. Smaller intervenors were 
frequently content to let OPC make the running on their behalf. 
- The use of stipulations increased dramatically over time. In the first decade 
from 1976 there were 20 electricity base rate cases and no stipulations; in the 
second decade there were another 20 base rate cases and three stipulations; in 
the last decade there have been only 10 base rate cases, all but one of which 
have been resolved by stipulation (plus another 2 stipulations bearing on base 
rate issues). 
                                                 
56 The successor stipulation involving this utility (PEF 2005) did not repeat this refund provision. PEF 
maintained that it had fulfilled its commitment to improve performance, and would continue to focus 
on its customer service and reliability consistent with Commission standards. This suggests a greater 
element of flexibility, tackling specific problems as and when needed, than a commission might be 
minded to implement. 
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- All these stipulations have been associated with rate freezes, refunds and rate 
reductions, none explicitly with rate increases. 
- Although stipulations regularly cite savings in time and cost of regulatory 
proceedings, this cannot explain their extent and nature. The cost savings 
involved are several orders of magnitude less than the revenues at issue. 
Rather, the signatory parties secure greater and different gains from a 
stipulation than they would if the case went to a litigated hearing. 
- Benefits to consumers in terms of rate reductions and refunds associated with 
electricity stipulations totalled over $3 billions over the period 1986 to 2006. 
All these benefits were greater or earlier than would otherwise have occurred. 
About three quarters of the rate reductions (by value) would not have occurred 
at all in the absence of the stipulations.  
- In some cases stipulations changed the basis of rate reductions and refunds, to 
adopt energy-based instead of demand-based rate reductions. This was to the 
benefit of larger users. Whether smaller users were on balance better off 
depends on whether the overall reductions were more than 10 per cent greater 
than they would have been in the absence of the stipulations. It is likely that 
this was the case. 
- Why do utilities sign stipulations that involve rate freezes instead of increases, 
or greater rate reductions and refunds than they would otherwise be forced to 
make? In some cases the parties offer commitments that FPSC cannot do (such 
as agreeing not to request rate reductions, or withdrawing opposition in other 
fora). In other cases the stipulations embody changes in regulatory policy 
compared to what FPSC would otherwise adopt. 
- Many of the stipulations reflected a less conservative policy on depreciation, 
amortization, accruals and reserves than FPSC had adopted. For example, 
possible storm damage costs are recovered ex post rather than by building up 
reserves. Some stipulations involved discretion for the utility to accelerate its 
depreciation and/or to reduce it. 
- Stipulations have abandoned the rate of return ‘building block’ approach using 
allowed return on equity (ROE) applied to an agreed rate base in order to 
determine rate levels. Instead, they have introduced fixed prices for specified 
periods of time (rate freezes often following refunds or rate reductions) with 
little or no explicit reference to ROE and rate base. 
- Some stipulations have approved new investments entering the rate base, and 
modified conventional regulatory treatment of fuel costs and base rates, as part 
of an agreement to freeze base rates. 
- Whereas FPSC had approved proposals for earnings caps and earnings sharing 
incentive schemes, stipulations have replaced these by revenue-sharing 
arrangements (without earnings caps) in order to enhance incentives and 
facilitate enforcement. The stipulations provide that such mechanisms are the 
only basis for dealing with excess revenues, with no effective regulatory role 
for ROE. 
- Stipulations have embodied some changes, or prevention of changes, in rate 
structure. Examples include the introduction of targeted refunds for failure to 
meet specified quality of service standards, and the temporary preservation of 
uneconomic rate schedules.  
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10.2 Further reflections 
 
Stipulations have thus changed significantly certain aspects of regulatory decision-
making in the Florida electricity sector. The result has been a greater emphasis on 
refunds, earlier and more certain rate reductions, and greater use of price freezes to 
protect against rate increases. To achieve this, the stipulations reflect a less 
conservative and more flexible approach to accounting and regulatory conventions, 
little role for ROE, and the kind of price cap incentive regulation that has been used 
elsewhere (for example, in the UK).  
 
Could it be argued that the outcome is less satisfactory than would otherwise have 
occurred? Utilities negotiated and chose to sign stipulations in preference to FPSC 
decisions, as did a wide variety of intervenor consumer groups. It is difficult to argue 
that electricity customers did not prefer earlier and more tangible price. OPC is surely 
no less attuned than FPSC to the interests of consumers since it is statutorily charged 
with representing those interests whereas FPSC has a more neutral duty to fix fair, 
just and reasonable rates having regard to actual legitimate costs. Public Counsel 
himself was reappointed repeatedly for the twenty five years until his retirement. 
Other intervenor consumer groups repeatedly looked to OPC to represent their 
interests. The outcomes of stipulations were repeatedly acclaimed in the media. FPSC 
staff may have challenged some of the elements of the stipulations, but FPSC 
commissioners never challenged the substance in their judgements. 
 
The changes are unlikely to have emerged from the traditional formal hearing process, 
and some could not have done so. Frequently, stipulations followed protests against 
FPSC’s previous decisions. Some of the stipulation provisions aroused the concerns 
of FPSC staff, or at least staff wished to ensure that FPSC fully appreciated the extent 
to which the stipulation modified FPSC policy. In the event FPSC accepted all the 
stipulations put to it. It consistently encouraged stipulated settlements as a more 
effective method of regulation. It also caught the mood of the stipulations in 
remarking early on that the Commission could not secure a more attractive deal for 
customers in the time available: “Hence we believe this bird in the hand is worth 
taking.” All the stipulations seem to have reflected a preference for the bird in hand. 
 
Experience in Florida shows that, within a regulatory framework, interested parties 
can indeed negotiate and come to agreement with utilities, at least where rate 
reductions and rate freezes are attainable. Whether similar agreements will be reached 
in future, when rate increases may be the order of the day, remains to be seen. But 
experience in Florida (as in Canada and elsewhere) does offer the prospect of an 
evolution in ratemaking procedure. The regulatory Commission can have a less 
prominent role: as a facilitator of contractual agreements between producers and 
consumers that reflect their knowledge and interests, rather than as a substitute for 
their judgements. 
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Appendix 1 Staff calculations of customer benefits in FPL 1999 
 
Alternative staff made two calculations. The first, based on a historic view of 
earnings, was as follows. 
In 1998, FPL’s achieved earnings were 12.6% even with FPL recording $372m of additional 
expenses under the Commission Plan.  The rate reduction is less than the amount of additional 
expenses recorded in 1998. In a rate case, rates would be set at the midpoint. Under the 
stipulation the midpoint is 11.0%. 
This is saying, in effect, that if the additional expenses would not be required in future 
and other costs remained the same, then rates could be reduced by $372m on a 
permanent basis and still yield 12.6% ROE; in addition the rates could be further 
reduced by the difference between 12.6% and 11.0% ROE. The revenue impact of 1% 
change in ROE was $89.5m for FPL in 2001.57 So the scope for rate reduction based 
on this historical view would have been about $372m + (1.6 x $89.5m) = $515m.  
 
Alternative staff’s second calculation, based on a prospective view of earnings, was as 
follows. 
Under the Stipulation, staff estimates of the achieved return on equity indicate that FPL will 
earn over 12.0% … in 1999 and that the achieved earnings will continue to grow over the 
three year period. 
In other words, having made the $350m rate reduction, and assuming no additional 
expenses of $372m, the expected ROE would exceed the 11% midpoint by over 1% in 
1999, and would thereafter increase. The expected scope for reduction based on this 
prospective view of earnings would therefore be over $350m + $89.5 = $439.5m and 
increasing over time. 
 
How much over 12% would FPL be expected to earn? Primary staff gives a specific 
number. “We calculate that the Stipulation will result in an achieved ROE of 13.3% 
assuming FPL does not opt to record any ‘amortization amount’.” If a full hearing 
process would not allow any such ‘amortization amount’, the scope for rate reduction 
in 1999 would be $350m + (13.3 – 11.0) x $89.5m = $556m.58
 
Appendix 2 Impact of other stipulations on rate reductions and refunds  
 
This Appendix reviews the evidence in each of the cases as to the impact of the 
stipulation on rate reductions and refunds. FPSC staff views, as reported in the 
decision dockets, are of assistance here. In some cases staff explicitly accepted that 
the benefits to customers were greater than could have been achieved if the case were 
litigated. In other cases staff questioned this. In three cases views differed within the 
staff, so that two views (primary and alternative staff views) were presented.59 In 
most cases, however, staff did not challenge the benefits involved, and any staff 
reservations about the stipulations generally concerned other aspects of the 
stipulation, as discussed later.  
 
The fourteen cases are as follows. 
                                                 
57 Source: Analysis of Florida Electric Utilities, December 2001 (FPSC factsheet). This is consistent 
with alternative staff comment that “A million dollars is a little over a basis point for FPL”. (A basis 
point is 1/100 of 1%, so corresponds to $895,000.)  
58 As to the increase in earnings over time, primary staff says that historically FPL’s revenue has grown 
at about 3% a year, so earnings could be expected to grow by at least that rate. 
59 These three cases were GPC 1993, TECO 1996 and FPL 1999. 
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FPC 1986: This is discussed in the main text. (Classified N/E) 
 
FPC 1987: A large user (Occidental Chemical Corporation) claimed that FPC rates 
should be reduced by $362.6m on an ongoing basis to reflect (inter alia) a lower ROE 
and the lower federal tax rate. FPSC opened a docket and FPC proposed a reduction 
of $61.7m. FPC, OPC and Occidental subsequently agreed a reduction of $140m 
($121.5m permanent based on lower ROE and $18.5m tax credit). FPSC noted that 
the $140m revenue reduction was “the largest in the history of this State”, and that the 
$121.5m was “within 4 % of our Staff’s position for the Prehearing Conference”. The 
latter is typically a bargaining position that FPSC would not normally expect to 
secure. (Classified G) 
 
GPC 1993: GPC filed for a rate increase citing FPRC’s recent dismantlement policy 
as implying $10.8m increase. OPC and GPC agreed a lower ROE, deferred 
dismantlement, and withdrawal of the filed application.  Staff were split on the merits 
of the stipulation but agreed that it avoided a present rate increase and (via the lower 
ROE) would reduce future rates. (Classified N) 
 
TECO 1996a: In face of continued excess earnings, FPSC accepted TECO proposals 
in 1993 and 1994 to apply overearnings to a storm damage renewal account, and 
accepted further TECO proposals in May 1995 and January 1996 to defer excess 
revenues to future years. OPC objected and in March 1996 agreed with TECO to 
allow some deferrals but also to refund $25m and to freeze rates until end-1998. Staff 
were again split on the merits, but there was no suggestion that there would otherwise 
be any refund. (Classified N) 
 
TECO 1996b: This provided for the regulatory treatment of new investment at 
TECO’s Polk power station and also included another $25m refund. Staff were 
concerned about a number of issues including the treatment of Polk, but did not 
suggest that there would otherwise have been a refund. (Classified N) 
 
FPC 1997a, b: These two cases involved actions to avoid possible rate increases, and 
in the second case explicitly to freeze base rates, rather than to secure refunds or rate 
reductions. They are not included in Table 3. 
 
FPL 1999: This case is discussed in the main text. (Classified N/G)  
 
GPC 1999: In response to concerns about earnings and ROE, GPC proposed an 
earnings sharing incentive plan. FPSC rejected this and approved an alternative plan 
proposed by staff. OPC objected and filed for a rate case. OPC and GPC then agreed a 
reduction of $10m with 3 year revenue sharing. Staff analysis mirrored the points 
made in FPL 1999, noting that “at the conclusion of a full rate case a greater reduction 
is possible. However, that would be after eight to twelve months.” Staff recommended 
approval of the stipulation since the $10m rate reduction resulted in immediate and 
significant savings to all ratepayers, and in addition there was the potential for 
revenue sharing. (Classified N/E) 
 
TECO 2000: FPSC initially calculated that the previous stipulations (TECO 1996a,b) 
implied a refund to customers for overearnings of $11.2m in 1997 and 1998, later 
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revised to $12.3m. OPC and TECO agreed a slightly higher refund of $13m. In 
January 2001 FPSC approved a further refund of $6.1m for 1999 sharing, revised 
after protest to $6.3m. (Classified G) 
 
FPL 2002: FPSC opened a rate review as FPL’s 1999 stipulation came to its expiry 
date. OPC and FPL agreed a further rate reduction of $250m and a continuation of the 
revenue cap and sharing scheme for nearly 4 years. There was no suggestion that in 
the absence of the stipulation there would be a rate reduction greater than $250m, or 
indeed any rate reduction at all. The stipulated rate reduction depended on departures 
from certain FPSC accounting policies. FPSC approved, noting the immediate 
benefits to customers and the additional refunds that the previous scheme had brought 
(then totalling $128m to date plus $84m projected for final year). (Classified N/G) 
 
FPC 2002:  In 2000 FPSC opened a docket to review FPC’s earnings. In 2001 it 
ordered $113.9m held subject to refund, later reduced to $98m. Testimony was filed 
and discovery ended March 2002, at about the same time as FPL agreed its 
stipulation. Shortly afterwards, FPC, OPC and others agreed a stipulation in similar 
form to FPL 2002 including a rate reduction of $125m and a refund of $35m. FPSC 
approved, noting that the reduction and refund afforded ratepayers immediate relief, 
and the revenue sharing plan could result in future refunds. (Classified G/E) 
 
FPL 2005: In March 2005 FPL requested a rate increase of $430m for 2006 plus a 
further $123m increase when its new plant came into service in June 2007. In 
contrast, OPC indicated that FPL’s rates should reduce by $679m. Other intervenors, 
this time including the Florida Attorney General’s office, filed to support OPC’s case. 
The parties agreed a last-minute stipulation involving no change in rates for four 
years. The strong view of the Attorney General’s Office was that there should be no 
rate increase It is perceived that this facilitated a settlement.60 Various modifications 
of FPSC accounting policy were implied by the stipulation. The FPSC approved the 
settlement, endorsing the previous and prospective benefits to customers listed by the 
stipulation. (Classified G) 
 
PEF (formerly FPC) 2005: In April 2005 PEF requested a $206m rate increase for 
2006 onwards. OPC argued that PEF’s rates should be reduced by $630m. Substantial 
agreement was reached before settlement of FPL 2000, and finalised shortly 
afterwards. The main provisions, not dissimilar to those of FPL 2005, included no 
change in existing base rates for four years (except for miscellaneous increases of 
about $15m). FPSC approved the stipulation in similar terms as for FPL 2005. 
(Classified G) 
 
 
                                                 
60 A formal administrative hearing was set to begin on Monday 22 August 2005. The parties considered 
that the gap between them was so great that there was no point in talking. Then, on Friday 19 August, 
the Attorney General’s office telephoned the parties and suggested a meeting. The Attorney General 
Mr Charles J Christ Jr had consistently taken a strong pro-consumer stand and was perceived as a 
candidate for Governor in due course. (And the former Public Counsel, Mr Jack Shreve, was now an 
adviser in his Office.) After meeting all weekend, the parties reached agreement late on Sunday night, 
and signed and filed the stipulation on Monday morning. The hearing was recessed to allow staff to 
review the settlement, and advise the commission when it reconvened on Wednesday 24 August. 
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Appendix 3 The method of rate reduction 
 
The main text describes the issue in TECO 1996a. Five other cases discuss the 
method of the rate refund or reduction. 
 
TECO 1996b: This provided for a further $25m refund on the same energy basis as in 
TECO 1996a. On this second occasion, the staff recommendation was unanimously in 
favour of the stipulation (no doubt bearing in mind the FPSC decision on the previous 
stipulation). Nonetheless, staff pointed out that there were advantages and 
disadvantages with the stipulation. Prominent among the disadvantages was the 
proposed method of distributing the rate reduction. The staff analysis reprinted almost 
verbatim the concern previously voiced by alternative staff.61
 
FPL 1999: This stipulation proposed once again to reduce rates by reference to the 
energy charge. This time the proposed reduction was $350m permanent (rather than 
just a one-time refund) plus revenue-sharing. Staff opinion was split on the stipulation 
as a whole, but unanimous in its concern about the method of rate reduction.62  
 
GPC 1999: This stipulation proposed the same method, again for a $10m permanent 
rate reduction. Staff recommended that the stipulation as a whole be approved, and 
again noted its concern about the method. However, Staff seems by now to have 
accepted that FPSC was willing to accept reductions on an energy basis rather than 
demand basis, and even found a justification for this approach.63
 
FPL 2002 and FPC 2002: These stipulations again made substantial reductions in 
rates, but this time they were across-the-board rather than on energy costs alone. Staff 
expressed a degree of satisfaction, even of relief, using essentially the same words in 
both cases.64  
 
It seems unlikely that it was pressure from the Commission or staff that led the 
stipulating parties to discontinue the energy-based rate reductions. Such pressure had 
                                                 
61 Staff had an additional concern about the treatment of off-system sales that might subsidise 
wholesale sales at the expense of retail ratepayers. The parties slightly modified the stipulation on 27 
September to address this point.  
62 Primary Staff repeated much of the previous argument. “By reducing rates on a kWh basis, high load 
factor classes … such as large commercial and industrial classes, receive a proportionately larger share 
of the reduction than they would had the reduction been allocated in a manner similar to that used in a 
rate case.  Conversely, lower load factor classes, such as residential and small commercial classes, 
receive a smaller share of the reduction.” 
63 “Although staff continues to believe allocating the reduction on a demand and energy component 
better matches the way dollars are collected through base rates, we recognise that the reduction in the 
base rate energy charge for all customers is administratively quicker to implement and more easily 
explained to customers. Similarly, since any shared revenue credits are to be shown as a separate line 
item on the bill, allocating these dollars on an energy basis makes the credit easier for the customers to 
relate to the other charges on their bill.” 
64 “This allocation methodology differs from FPL’s previous rate stipulations that allocated the 
reduction on a kWh basis. The percentage reduction in base rates is a better method of allocating a 
decrease because all classes receive the same percentage reduction in base rates. Under an energy 
allocation, a larger percentage of total reduction goes to larger commercial and industrial customers 
relative to residential and small commercial customers.” Docket No. 001148, Order No. PSC-02-0501-
AS-EI, issued April 11, 2002, p. 3. See also Docket No. 000824, Order No. PSC-02-0655-AS-EI, 
issued May 14, 2002, p. 4. 
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clearly not been effective in the past, and staff had become resigned to the 
Commission’s acceptance of energy-based reductions.  
 
A more plausible explanation for the changed approach is that, for FPL at least, the 
rates in effect as of 2002 already reflected the energy-based reductions effected 
earlier. The stipulation in 2002, which provided for an across-the-board rate 
reduction, protected these gains by avoiding the rebasing based on relative costs that 
would have accompanied a traditional rate hearing. The stipulation essentially 
prolonged the energy-based reductions and the associated benefits already established 
by the large users. The wording of the staff analysis is consistent with this conjecture. 
 
FPL’s rate structure has not been formally reviewed since its last rate case in 1983. Since then, 
new classes have been added and customers have shifted among rate classes seeking more 
advantageous rates. Based on FPL’s cost of service study, there are disparities among the rates 
of return by class. In a rate case, one of the goals of rate design is to set rates that reflect the 
costs to serve that class or, stated differently, to set the rate of return for each class equal to the 
system rate of return. We recognise, however, that a Stipulation is a negotiated document with 
all participants making some concessions. While the proposed across-the-board percentage 
reduction does not move FPL’s rate structure towards parity, it does not worsen it. 
Accordingly, we find that the across-the-board reduction is reasonable. 
 
It is not clear whether FPC’s rates were as favourable to large users as FPL’s: the 
utility had not had a previous stipulation that reduced rates on an energy basis, and the 
staff analysis does not explicitly claim that there are disparities by class at FPC. 
However, there are similar indications of concern about changes that have taken place 
over time.65 These are followed by the same remarks about the Stipulation being a 
negotiated document and not making the rate structure worse. 
 
As regards calculations of the extent of the distortion, in the first case (TECO 1996a), 
staff conjectured as follows. “If the $25m is allocated on energy, the residential 
customers could realize up to $4.25 million less in total refund dollars than if the 
refund were allocated on demand ($10.75 million versus $15 million).” This 
calculation assumed that residential customers accounted for 60% of peak demand but 
only 43% of energy demand (in MWh). The refund to residential customers on a peak 
demand basis would have been 60/43 = 1.395 or 39.5% higher than it was on an 
energy basis.  
 
A second calculation in the same staff analysis suggested that the peak demand basis 
might have justified only 55% of the reduction. On this basis the refund to residential 
customers would have been 55/43 = 1.279 or 27.9% higher than on the energy basis.   
 
A later calculation by staff (FPL 1999) suggests that both the above estimates may 
have overestimated the transfer from residential to industrial customers.  
 
                                                 
65 “Order No. PSC-01-1348-PCO-EI, requiring FPC to file MFRs, states that one of the reasons for 
requiring MFRs was to ensure proper ratemaking and cost allocations among the rate classes to reflect 
changes that have occurred since the company’s last rate case. FPC’s most recent fully allocated cost of 
service study was filed in 1991, and utilised a prospective 1993 test year. Since that time, significant 
changes have taken place in the company’s operations, and cost shifting among the rate classes has 
occurred. / This Commission has historically sought to establish rates that recover the cost to serve 
each rate class. Stated differently, this Commission has attempted to set the rate of return for each rate 
class as close as practicable to the system-wide rate of return.” 
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For illustrative purposes, staff has estimated the impact on residential customers of allocating 
the entire $350 million reduction on a 12 CP and 1/13 AD basis66, in lieu of the proposed 
energy basis. … Based on this data, the residential customers would receive a .463 cent per 
kWh reduction in their non-fuel energy charge, as compared to the .420 reduction proposed. 
The demand allocation would result in a reduction of $4.68 on the monthly 1,000 kWh bill, a 
$.43 larger reduction than under the energy allocation. / Staff believes that the use of a 
demand allocator more closely reflects how the reduction would be distributed in a full 
requirements rate case.67
 
This calculation is that a demand-based reduction would imply a reduction for 
residential customers that was 0.463/0.420 = 1.10 or 10% higher than on an energy 
basis.   
 
Appendix 4 Accounting policy 
 
The following summaries highlight those aspects of the stipulations that refer to 
accounting policy. 
 
FPC 1986: This noted the problem posed for the company by the Commission’s 
recent ruling on depreciation.68 It specified that the $54m refund was contingent on 
the Commission’s acceptance that it was in lieu of (inter alia) any represcription of 
FPC’s depreciation rates before 1988. 
 
GPC 1993: The utility filed for a rate increase citing FPSC’s recent dismantlement 
policy.69  The stipulation provided that GPC would use an alternative straight-line 
method of calculation that deferred the amount of the dismantlement accrual, agreed a 
lower ROE and provided that the rate would remain unchanged. Primary staff 
recommendation was not to approve the stipulation because of inter-generational 
inequities and because all electricity companies should have a proper chance to debate 
what was a generic issue.70  Alternative staff noted the benefits of avoiding the 
present rate increase and of lower future rates.  
                                                 
66 “The bulk of FPL’s fixed production and transmission plant costs were allocated based on each 
class’s estimated contribution to the 12 monthly maximum system peaks. This method, known as the 
12 Coincident Peak and 1/13 Average Demand (12 CP and 1/13 AD) method, was used to allocate 
most fixed production and transmission costs for each of the four major investor-owned utilities in their 
last full requirements rate cases.” (p. 5) 
67 Memorandum: Case background, Docket No. 990067-EI, March 15, 1999, Primary Staff analysis pp. 
5-6. Also endorsement by Alternative Staff at p. 12. 
68 “Public Counsel and FPC further recognise that FPC’s costs are subject to increase in a substantial 
but uncertain amount from a pending represcription of its depreciation rates in Docket No. 851097-El, 
and that a deferral of such represcription is essential to FPC’s ability to provide a benefit from the 
aforementioned cost reductions to its customers. OPC and FPC wished to provide an immediate benefit 
to customers in a manner that satisfactorily balanced the interests of the company and its customers.”  
69 In 1989 an FPSC order had established a new method for calculating the amount of the accrual for 
the dismantlement of fossil fuel plant. FPSC had agreed to GPC’s request that new depreciation rates 
and dismantlement accruals be effective in its next rate case. Now, GPC mentioned a $10.8m revenue 
impact of its depreciation study, and said that the method prescribed in the FPSC order “places 
significant upward pressure on the Company’s retail rates and charges to the general body of 
customers, and places the Company in the position of having to seek retail rate relief in order to cover 
such expenses”. 
70 “deferring implementation results in inter-generational inequities in that a delay in implementation 
would only move those dollars of expense into the future – with a shorter period of recovery”.  “Now, 
at this point GPC wishes to re-argue the Commission’s prescribed policy without the involvement of 
the other electric companies. … if GPC wishes the Commission to readdress the methodology for 
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TECO 1996a: In 1993 FPSC approved TECO’s proposal to use a reduction in its 
authorised ROE to begin a $4m annual storm damage accrual, and not to make a rate 
reduction as OPC urged. In 1994 FPSC applied any overearnings to increase this 
storm damage accrual. In contrast, TECO March 1996 applied the overearnings to a 
refund. One of the concerns of alternative staff about the TECO March 1996 
stipulation was that a refund might not be the best way of using excess revenues, since 
“other opportunities to reduce regulatory assets, mitigate potential ‘stranded costs’, or 
handle other regulatory balance sheet concerns will be foregone”. 
 
FPC 1997b: see text. 
 
FPL 1999: FPSC’s conservative policy applied not least to FPL, where there was a 
plan for writing off assets.71 In December 1998 the Commission approved a further 
proposal to extend the plan through 2000. Various parties now filed protests. 72 In 
January 1999 OPC filed a petition to have FPSC conduct a full revenue requirements 
rate case, alleging that “while long-term benefits for both FPL and its customers may 
have been achieved by the ‘Plans’ approved by the FPSC [over the five years 1995-
1999], the time has now come for the customers to share in the benefits.” 
 
FPL 1999 authorized FPL to record amortization up to $100m per year to reduce 
nuclear and/or fossil plant in service, in addition to normal depreciation. It also 
provided that accruals for nuclear decommissioning and fossil dismantlement would 
be capped at previously authorised levels. Making these charges discretionary or 
capping them facilitated the $350m reduction in base rates. Because of this benefit, 
primary staff recommendation was to approve the stipulation, but the analysis was so 
heavily qualified that it could have been the basis for a rejection. The discretionary 
amortization was a serious concern because it would mean that depreciation would 
reflect the variability of the company’s revenues rather than be matched to asset 
service life.73 FPSC accepted the stipulation without commenting on this modification 
of its accounting policy. 
 
                                                                                                                                            
calculating the dismantlement accruals, another generic docket should be opened where all companies 
can participate. It should not be buried as an issue in the Company’s next rate case.” 
71 In 1995 FPSC accepted FPL’s proposal for writing off various deficits and regulatory assets totalling 
$485m during 1995, 1996 and 1997. In 1997 FPSC extended the plan so as to write off a further $401m 
in 1998 and 1999. Dockets 950359-EI and 970410-EI refer.  
72 The parties were FIPUG, Tropicana Products Inc, the Coalition for Equitable Rates (CER), the 
Florida Alliance for Lower Electric Rates Today (ALERT) and Georgia Pacific Corporation. 
73 “In a word, this is accelerated depreciation. The potential end-point is that the design of depreciation 
rates, and the resultant rate base, will no longer reflect the matching principle, but rather, the degree of 
variability in the company’s revenues. … / One of the basic axioms of depreciation is to match capital 
recovery with consumption. Staff is concerned with the concept of using economic conditions to adjust 
depreciation expenses which should properly be matched to service life. Previously, the Commission 
has approved faster write-offs of perceived reserve deficits, and of unrecovered net plant that are not 
life related; such actions were considered not to conflict with the matching principle. / The Stipulation 
essentially allows FPL the flexibility to shorten the recovery period of the fossil/nuclear plants. This is 
not the writing off of a perceived historical deficit, but simply accelerated depreciation, in conflict with 
the matching principle. Staff’s concern is that each step made in this direction makes the next step 
easier. Further, the amortization will reduce the company’s achieved earnings over the life of the 
Stipulation.” 
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GPC 1999: In response to concerns about earnings and ROE, GPC proposed an 
earnings sharing incentive plan that reduced its authorised ROE from 12% to 11.6% 
and shared any earnings in excess of 12.6% in the following ratios: 40% to the 
company shareholders, 20% to write off certain regulatory assets and to increase the 
Property Insurance Reserve, and 40% refunded to customers. FPSC was attracted by 
the earnings incentive concept and by the notion of writing off assets.74 But FPSC 
was not satisfied with the parameters, so it rejected this plan and approved an 
alternative plan proposed by staff, which involved lower proportions to the 
shareholders and customers and a higher proportion to writing off assets.75 This plan 
was in turn challenged by OPC and superceded by the stipulation GPC 1999 that 
provided for an immediate $10m rate reduction for customers; for revenues (rather 
than earnings) between certain levels to be shared in the ratio 1/3 to shareholders and 
2/3 to customers; and for all revenues in excess of the upper level to be refunded 
entirely to customers. GPC was given discretion up to specified annual amounts to 
write off the regulatory assets and increase the Property Insurance Reserve. Again, the 
FPSC accepted the stipulation without commenting on this aspect. 
 
FPL 2002: As FPL 1999 came towards termination, the parties considered a further 
agreement. The challenge was to enable a further significant rate reduction, this time 
of $250m. FPL 2002 authorised the company to reduce depreciation by up to $125m 
per year, which would effectively fund half the rate reduction. FPL agreed to 
withdraw its request for an increase in the annual accrual to the storm damage reserve, 
and instead would petition FPSC for recovery of prudently incurred costs in the event 
that there were insufficient funds in the reserve. This would avoid whatever rate 
increase that cost represented. 
 
FPC 2002: This stipulation, contemporaneous with FPL 2002, took a similar 
approach. FPSC had already placed $98m subject to refund but OPC evidently 
envisaged more. To help fund the $125m rate reduction, there was an annual 
reduction in depreciation of $62.5m, with the company given discretion to reverse all 
or part of this, and discretion to accelerate amortization of certain regulatory assets. 
Accruals for nuclear decommissioning and fossil dismantlement were suspended, 
worth another $16m.76  It was agreed that, when the new plant Hines Unit 2 came on 
stream, its costs would be recovered through the Fuel and Purchase Cost Recovery 
Clause until 2005 (the end of the stipulation): this kept that additional item out of the 
cost base. 
 
                                                 
74 “Gulf is expected to bring additional generating capacity on line in 2002, which could increase 
revenue requirements. A plan which reduces future revenue requirements by writing off past costs 
before 2002 and encourages it to become more efficient … will mitigate the impact of this additional 
investment.” (Docket 990244-EI, Order PSC-99-1047-PAA-EI, May 24, 1999, p. 7. 
75 This plan provided for writing off certain regulatory assets and increasing the Property Insurance 
Reserve by specified amounts; reduced the authorised ROE from 12% to 11.2%; shared earnings 
between 12.2% and 14.2% in the following ratios: 2/3 to further write off certain regulatory assets and 
increase the Property Insurance Reserve and 1/3 to company shareholders; and refunded to customers 
any earnings over 14.2%. 
76 It has been suggested that this may have followed a decision to extend the life of nuclear and other 
stations. However, it has also been suggested that FPSC had approved FPC’s dismantlement and 
decommissioning studies less than a year earlier, and that these studies had indicated that continued 
accrual was necessary. 
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FPL 2005: Three years later, the new challenge was to avoid a rate increase for FPL 
when the company had requested a rate increase of $430m, particularly given that the 
Attorney General’s Office had indicated a strong preference for no rate increase. The 
requested increase comprised $100m for GridFlorida expenses, $100m for an increase 
to storm damage accrual, and $225m for two recently-introduced generation plants. 
The stipulation FPL 2005 dealt with these three items by, respectively 1) affirming 
FPL’s right to recovery of prudent incremental costs associated with establishing a 
Regional Transmission Organization, thereby obviating the need for an immediate 
base rate increase77; 2) allowing FPL to levy a surcharge and/or to securitize any 
under-recovery or replenishment of the storm damage fund; and 3) suspending future 
storm damage accrual ($20.3m annually), suspending FPL’s nuclear decommissioning 
accrual ($78.5m annually) and giving FPL the option to amortize up to $125m 
annually as a credit to depreciation and a debit to depreciation reserve (that is, to 
reduce depreciation). The first two steps avoided the need for any immediate rate 
increase, the remaining measures provided earnings cover for the new plants. The 
parties explained that ‘in a period of unprecedented world energy prices’ their aim 
was ‘to maintain a degree of stability to FPL’s base rates and charges’. 
 
PEF 2005: A similarly imaginative approach was taken to PEF’s requested $206m 
rate increase, which comprised $50m for an increase to storm damage accrual, $70m 
for an increase in depreciation and dismantlement expenses and $86m for the new 
Hines Units 2 and 3 that had been brought into service in December 2003 and 2005. 
Stipulation PEF 2005 provided for 1) no increase in storm damage accrual, since in 
future storm costs would be recovered through surcharge and/or securitization; 2) no 
increase in depreciation and dismantlement expenses by virtue of a continued 
suspension of nuclear decommissioning accrual ($7.7m annually) and fossil fuel 
dismantlement accrual ($9.9m annually); 3) continued recovery of all Hines Unit 2 
costs from the fuel recovery clause until December 2007 when Unit 4 comes on 
stream and base rates will increase for both Unit 2 (about $38m) and Unit 4 ($49.4m); 
and 4) lower depreciation rates ($30m) with discretion for accelerated amortization, 
an increase in miscellaneous revenues ($15m) and an adjustment to PEF’s deemed 
equity ratio (worth $5m) to provide earnings coverage for the new Hines 3 unit.  
 
                                                 
77 Parties could participate in subsequent proceedings for the purpose of challenging the reasonableness 
and prudence of such costs but not for challenging FPL’s right to clause recovery. 
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